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ABSTRACT 
 
Copyright holders have deployed a wide range of enforcement strategies this 
past decade.  In an initial, punitive stage, content industries targeted individual 
copyright infringers by way of an extensive settlement demand campaign and 
obtained statutory damage awards in a few high profile file-sharing lawsuits.  
Recently however, copyright holders drastically reversed course, abandoning 
punitive measures in favor of a “copyright information approach” that enlists 
Internet service providers into sending copyright infringement notifications to 
subscribers. 
Commentators have welcomed this shift towards copyright alert systems as 
providing a more balanced approach to copyright enforcement that might improve 
copyright law’s normative acceptance.  Copyright industries are optimistic that the 
new copyright alert system will increase copyright awareness and decrease 
copyright infringing behavior. 
This Article shows that the optimism with copyright law’s recent developments 
is misplaced.  Based on social science research and insights from an empirical 
study conducted for this Article, we argue that architects of the copyright alert 
system have underestimated the robustness of social norms and have failed to 
anticipate the negative reactions to a copyright information system, in particular as 
relating to privacy harms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has been a transformative period in copyright enforcement.  
Motivated by unmitigated and ongoing infringement practices that pose a 
potentially existential threat to traditional revenue sources, copyright holders have 
waged an aggressive legal campaign against online piracy.1  The entertainment 
industry has certainly won its share of victories in this battle.  It managed to 
persuade courts to ban several mainstream file-sharing technologies on the basis of 
indirect copyright liability.2  Around the same time, the industry made an 
unprecedented shift in enforcement by beginning to target individual, non-
commercial infringers with an expansive enforcement campaign.3 Over 20,000 
individuals are reported to have entered into settlement agreements in order to 
avoid costly litigation.4  The unhappy few who pushed back were hit with six figure 
statutory damage awards for sharing copyrighted songs on peer-to-peer (P2P) file-
sharing networks.5 
This punitive approach to copyright enforcement has proven costly, however.  
Although copyright enforcement’s traditional targeting of commercial bootleggers 
has always been relatively uncontroversial,6 the music industry’s decision to send 
 
 1. For a description and discussion, see infra Part I. 
 2. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) (holding 
that distributing software with manifest intent to promote copyright infringement can render the 
software’s distributor liable for the infringing actions of third parties); In re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021–24 
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that Napster had sufficient knowledge of the availability of infringing material 
to impose indirect liability).  
 3. For an overview, see Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 
1260–64 (2011).   
 4. See RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2008), 
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later [https://perma.cc/XS7U-PBRF?type=source]. 
 5. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Joel Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 2011); see Dave 
Itzkoff, Student Fined $675,000 in Downloading Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/arts/music/01arts-GRADUATESTUD_BRF.html. 
 6. Historically, copyright enforcement has focused on commercial “pirates” that sell for-profit 
bootlegs, unlicensed software, and video games.  See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 111 
(Prometheus Books 2001) (“Our copyright laws have, until now, focused primarily on the relationships 
among those who write works of authorship and disseminate those works to the public.”); see also Jane 
C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”: Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in 
Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1488 (1995); Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
679, 713–14 (2003) (“Copyright owners have traditionally avoided targeting end users of copyrighted 
works. . . .  One is pressed to find any example of copyright law being enforced against individuals for 
home copying (as opposed to commercial activity) prior to 1990.”); see, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry 
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996) (contributory liability imposed on defendant who operated a 
swap meet where many of the vendors sold counterfeit goods); Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board, Inc., 
No. 00 Civ. 4660, 2002 WL 1997918, at *6, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (record companies brought 
action against Internet site operator that provided links to pirated copies of copyrighted musical 
recordings); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Computer & Entm’t, Inc., No. C96-0187, 1996 WL 511619, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. May 31, 1996) (defendant sold video game duplication devices for Nintendo game 
cartridges); Sega Entm’t Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (defendant made 
available unauthorized copies of Sega games on a fee-based Internet bulletin board).  See generally 
Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, 
and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. Rev. 731 (2003) (explaining the distinctions between commercial 
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settlement letters to teenagers and college students has proven to be more 
contentious.  Somewhere along the way, the music industry lost public support and 
copyright law earned a bad reputation.7  An increasing number of copyright 
skeptics faulted the lack of balance between the entertainment industry’s chosen 
means and ends.  Critics condemned statutory damage awards as grossly excessive8 
and decried the callous nature of the RIAA settlement letters, portraying the 
campaign as a form of legal extortion.9 
Concerned with the negative impact of its enforcement policies on public 
attitudes, the entertainment industry changed course.  The music industry 
abandoned its mass settlement campaign and ceased dragging file-sharers into court 
for high-profile statutory award disputes in favor of a more moderate approach to 
digital copyright infringements.  In 2011, the music and movie industries’ leading 
organizations (the RIAA and MPAA, respectively) collaborated with the major 
Internet service providers (ISPs) to implement the Copyright Alert System (CAS).  
Modeled after so-called “graduated response” systems abroad, the CAS seeks to 
discourage copyright infringement by enlisting ISPs to send subscribers an 
escalating series of alerts upon notification by content holders of allegedly 
infringing activities.10  After the sixth notification, an ISP can elect to apply a 
“mitigation measure,” which may include a reduction in upload/download 
transmission speeds and redirection to a landing page until the matter is resolved.11 
The Copyright Alert System is the latest iteration in a ten year experiment with 
copyright enforcement approaches in the era of broadband connection and digital 
content.  The CAS is the final and most complete shift from one extreme 
enforcement strategy to another.  While the settlement letter campaign and statutory 
awards sought to deter by way of stringent sanctions, the CAS only seeks to deter 
indirectly by notifying subscribers that their infringing behavior has been noticed.  
The hope is that this will give pause to their future decision-making and lead them 
to legal alternatives.  Sanctions in the new system are almost non-existent.12  This 
 
piracy and noncommercial personal infringements). 
 7.     See, e.g., Peter Menell, This American Copyright Life: Reflections on Re-Equilibrating 
Copyright in the Internet Age, 61(2) J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 235, 262 (2014) (“These cases poured 
salt into the wounds opened by the mass litigation campaign. They reinforced the perception that 
copyright law disserves the public:  it deprives consumers of easy access to a broad catalog of music, 
imposes grossly disproportionate penalties on those caught file-sharing, and does little to support the 
artists.”)  (examining how to improve copyright’s “public approval rating”).  
 8. See Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 525 (2004); Pamela Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory 
Damages Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 53 (2009).  
 9. See Daniel Reynolds, The RIAA Litigation War on File Sharing and Alternatives More 
Compatible with Public Morality, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 977 (2008). 
 10. Chloe Albanesius, Pirates Beware, ISPs Agree to Copyright Alert System, PCMAG (July 7, 
2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2388184,00.asp [http://perma.cc/TWS9-H9JR] 
 11. See Memorandum of Understanding, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMATION (July 6, 2011), 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Memorandum-of-Understanding.pdf 
(establishing an Independent Review Program to resolve disputes arising from the Copyright Alert 
System). 
 12. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 11.  Although the Memorandum of 
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new, softer direction in enforcement has been welcomed as a more balanced 
approach that could help salvage copyright law’s tainted reputation13 while 
reducing infringements in the process.14 
This Article shows that much of the optimism with the CAS is misplaced.  First, 
copyright information systems are unlikely to reverse copy-norms.  Social science 
research indicates that, once internalized, norms are exceedingly hard to displace.15  
Given the widespread nature of online piracy and the perceived excesses of 
punitive copyright enforcement in the past, it is unlikely that moving away from 
punitive approaches will be sufficient to realign prevailing moral intuitions about 
copyright infringing behavior with copyright law. 
Second, architects of the CAS have underestimated the privacy backlash effects 
of copyright alert systems that co-opt Internet service providers in the pursuit of 
more effective copyright enforcement.16  Individuals react adversely when they 
suspect that their online activities are being monitored, especially when the 
perceived privacy incursions are deemed disproportionate to the nature of the 
offense at issue.17 
We support our claims on the basis of empirical findings that we gathered for 
this Article.  We collected data from two generations of college students in 2011 
and 2014 and combined that with data collected in the 2003 period.  This decade-
long timeline provides insight into the effect of copyright law enforcement on 
norms and behavior during a period when content industries experimented with a 
 
Understanding between content providers and service providers provides that the latter may reduce or 
restrict an infringers’ Internet access upon the sixth consecutive notification, such mitigation measures 
are at the full discretion of the service provider. 
 13. See Edward J. Damich, Our Copyright Code: Continue Patching or Start Rewriting?, 68 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 361, 374–75 (2014) (“For their part, copyright owners have abandoned their relentless 
campaign of attack on users, which has resulted in public relations (and jurisprudential) disasters like the 
Lenz case”); Stefan Larsson, Karl Renner and (Intellectual) Property—How Cognitive Theory Can 
Enrich A Sociolegal Analysis of Contemporary Copyright, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 3, 21 (2014) 
(According to Cary Sherman of the Recording Industry Association of America: “[t]his groundbreaking 
agreement ushers in a new day and a fresh approach to addressing the digital theft of copyrighted 
works” (citing to WIRED, July 7, 2011)); Peter S. Menell, This American Copyright Life: Reflections on 
Re-Equilibrating Copyright for the Internet Age, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 235, 334 (2014) (“It 
remains to be seen whether this approach will achieve its goals, but there can be little doubt that it offers 
a more balanced approach to illegal file-sharing than the mass litigation that unfolded from 2003 
through 2008”); Rachel Storch, Copyright Vigilantism, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 453, 468 (2013) (“The 
program has a variety of advantages over traditional enforcement under the Copyright Act.  It allows for 
a swift and efficient response to online infringement without the expense or procedural difficulties 
associated with litigation.  Copyright holders also benefit from avoiding the bad press associated with 
copyright infringement lawsuits.”).  Of course, the CAS is not without critics.  See infra note 71. 
 14. Initial findings from the more punitive French HADOPI graduate response system have 
encouraged content industry stakeholders.  See Brett Danaher et al., The Effect of Graduated Response 
Anti-Piracy Laws on Music Sales: Evidence from an Event Study in France, 62(3) J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 
541 (2014) (finding that increased consumer awareness of HADOPI caused iTunes song and album sales 
to increase by 22.5% and 25% respectively). 
 15. For a discussion on the stickiness of anti-legal norms, see Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. 
Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000). 
 16. Infra, Part IV. B.1. 
 17. Infra, Part IV. B.1. 
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varied set of enforcement approaches to combat digital piracy.  Specifically, it 
allows us to examine the various normative and deterrent effects of law 
enforcement, and in particular to study the change from stringent to more moderate 
enforcement modalities. 
The results reveal a bifurcated landscape of file-sharers and non-infringers in 
which copyright infringement actions are relatively unaffected by changes in 
enforcement modalities.  Noncompliant copy-norms remain remarkably stable over 
time and across enforcement strategies.  Despite extensive efforts to improve public 
relations, including the development of the CAS, our data indicates that prevailing 
copyright norms have remained relatively robust over time.  For example, our 
findings indicate that a majority of students do not perceive illegal downloading as 
immoral.  The negative reactions to copyright trolls and statutory awards seem to 
suggest that students strongly disapprove of copyright enforcement approaches that 
are linked to for-profit incentives and involve rewards that are most likely to be in 
excess of actual damages.  At the same time, however, we find that the CAS is met 
with as much disapproval as the RIAA settlement campaign.  In fact, when asked 
whether students feel that the “music industry is conducting an unjust, 
disproportionate policy,” the CAS prompted stronger negative reactions than the 
RIAA settlement campaign did.  We find no compelling evidence that the CAS 
brings about any more positive reactions that might help realign personal beliefs 
about online behavior with existing copyright laws. 
Our findings suggest that much of the optimism about the advantages of the 
CAS is based on several misunderstandings about the psychology of enforcement.  
First, the optimism about norm reversal ignores the path dependence of norm 
formation.  Because copy-norms have been internalized and subsequently bolstered 
by the heavy-handed copyright enforcement approaches of the past, it is unlikely 
that a moderate enforcement approach will alter preexisting public attitudes about 
copyright infringement.  In such circumstances, relaxing enforcement measures is a 
risky proposition for the industry because the reduction in deterrence is unlikely to 
yield any appreciable improvement in copyright attitudes.  Second, the creators of 
the CAS have underestimated the negative reactions to its graduated response 
system.  Although disproportionate sanctions are more likely to generate backlash 
than a system that raises the probability of enforcement, a great deal depends on the 
manner in which that higher probability is attained.  If more effective enforcement 
is accomplished by way of measures that are perceived negatively (such as 
perceived privacy intrusions), normative backlash may obtain regardless. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides a concise review of copyright 
law’s recent enforcement history.  Part II reflects on the turn towards more 
moderate copyright enforcement approaches.  Part III describes our empirical 
study.  Part IV presents the main results.  Part V includes discussion and policy 
findings. 
I.  COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT: A BRIEF HISTORY 
Digital copyright infringements present unprecedented challenges to the 
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enforcement of copyright law.18  Rising Internet bandwidth and advancements in 
digital compression technologies have greatly facilitated unauthorized access to 
copyrighted materials.  First with peer-to-peer file-sharing platforms,19 now 
increasingly by way of illegal streaming sites,20 it is clear that online copyright 
infringement is pervasive and remains widespread.  A recent study suggests that 
roughly twenty percent of Internet traffic is devoted to piracy.21  As access to 
unlicensed copyrighted materials online became common, music record sales 
plummeted without digital music sales able to make up for those losses.22 
 
 18. LITMAN, supra note 6 (reviewing the various challenges presented by new technology).  
 19. Up until 2010, there were an estimated ten million simultaneous users of peer-to-peer 
technologies at any given time.  John Boudreau, Illegal File Sharing Showing No Letup, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (July 3, 2006), http://old.seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/
2003101281_btfilesharing03.html [http://perma.cc/7VHQ-ZW85]; John Borland, Open-source P2P 
projects keep swapping, ZD NET (July 15, 2005), http://www.zdnet.com/article/open-source-p2p-
projects-keep-swapping/ [http://perma.cc/K5NT-RLMT]; Simon Crerar, Illegal File-Sharing As Popular 
As Ever, TIMES ONLINE (Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/arts/music/article2418137.ece 
[http://perma.cc/H88U-PQE5].  After the outcomes in Napster and Grokster, file-sharing activities 
relocated to various BitTorrent sites.  See Ernesto Van der Sar, Filesharing Report Shows Explosive 
Growth for uTorrent, TORRENTFREAK (Apr. 26, 2008),  
https://torrentfreak.com/p2p-statistics-080426/ [https://perma.cc/9STU-BXKJ] (reporting that number of 
uTorrent users worldwide more than doubled in 2008).  The past few years have seen a decline of 
Bittorrent for the first time.  Decline In Us Bittorrent Traffic, Says Study, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-24911187 [http://perma.cc/3Z59-SPLS] (reporting a 20% drop of 
Bittorrent Traffic in six month period in the second half of 2013); see also Ernesto Van der Sar, 
Bittorrent Traffic Drops in America, Grows in Europe, TORRENTFREAK (Nov. 11, 2013), https://
torrentfreak.com/bittorrent-traffic-drops-in-america-grows-in-europe-131111/ [https://perma.cc/N26L-
X2MB]. 
 20. Andy Greenberg, Inside Popcorn Time, the Piracy Party Hollywood Can’t Stop, WIRED (Mar. 
18, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/03/inside-popcorn-time-piracy-party-hollywood-cant-stop/ 
[http://perma.cc/E963-D7QF] (reporting 100,000 downloads each day); Brian Sodoma, Inside The Battle 
Over Illegal Streaming Sites: How The Film Industry Fights Back, FORBES (May 7, 2015), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/cit/2015/05/07/inside-the-battle-over-illegal-streaming-sites-how-the-film-
industry-fights-back/ [http://perma.cc/TL8B-VYYA] (noting “the growing number of piracy sites as a 
whole, which some say now makes up about 24 percent of global Internet traffic”); Christina Sterbenz et 
al., Here’s How Many People Really Use Sketchy Streaming Sites—And Why, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 
28, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/business-insider-online-streaming-survey-2014-4 [http://
perma.cc/U7BE-CRWW] (14% of survey respondents admitted to streaming unlicensed content); 
Howard Swains, Free Football Streaming: How Illegal Sites Keep Outpacing Broadcasters, THE 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/aug/01/faster-easier-free-illegal-
football-streams [http://perma.cc/W7QM-PR82] (discussing the phenomenon of professional illegal sites 
with “extraordinary volumes of traffic” and significant earnings).  
 21. Aaron Sankin, 24 Percent Of Internet Traffic Is Devoted To Piracy, Study Says, THE DAILY 
DOT (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.dailydot.com/business/nbcuniversal-comcast-piracy-study/ [http://
perma.cc/Y4SW-Z2BG] (reporting on study that estimates that “nearly one-quarter of the Internet’s total 
bandwidth is taken up by the illegal distribution of copyrighted content.”).  
 22. David Goldman, Music’s Lost Decade: Sales Cut in Half, CNN MONEY (Feb. 3, 2010), http://
money.cnn.com/2010/02/02/news/companies/napster_music_industry/ [http://perma.cc/9XSW-JBDM] 
(reporting a drop in music sales from 14.6 billion in 2000 to 6.3 billion in 2009); see also Nielson 
Report, U.S. Digital Music Sales Flat This Year, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2010) http://www.reuters.com/
article/2010/09/27/music-sales-us-idUSLDE68Q0SQ20100927 [http://perma.cc/9L5F-GUZ9] (digital 
music sales in the U.S. have stalled); Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, Plunge Sharply, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB117444575607043728 [http://perma.cc/
9XSW-JBDM].   
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When online file sharing initially became widespread, content industries issued 
legal challenges to software developers and web sites that facilitated copyright 
infringements.23  Once courts established that non-commercial file sharing by 
private users constitutes direct infringement on the rights of copyright holders, the 
entertainment industry pursued the developers of file sharing platforms on the basis 
of intermediary liability.  The Ninth Circuit established that developers of the first 
generation of centralized peer-to-peer technologies, represented by Napster, could 
be held accountable for copyright infringements on the basis of contributory 
liability.24  Accordingly, developers of file sharing platforms materially contributed 
to copyright infringements if they provided the “site and facilities” that enabled 
direct infringements (hosting a central list of the files on each user’s computer, 
etc.).25 
By the time of the Napster decision, a new generation of file sharing 
applications was already in use.  Though functionally equivalent to their 
predecessors, these file sharing platforms evaded the prevailing intermediary 
liability standards by decentralizing the technology and removing the role of central 
servers.26  When content industries challenged this second generation of 
technologies, they were initially unsuccessful in the lower courts and appellate 
stages.  Courts rejected the application of Napster to decentralized file sharing 
services because liability for contributory infringement implies “actual knowledge 
of infringement at a time when [file-sharing services] can use that knowledge to 
stop the particular infringement.”27  Ultimately, however, the industry obtained 
another victory when the Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions, holding 
that software providers are accountable for copyright violations if they invoke 
 
 23. Prior to the file-sharing technologies, content industries had won various copyright claims 
against commercial applications involved in unauthorized reproductions, and novel Internet services that 
reproduced music.  For instance, record companies won a copyright suit against MP3.com, which 
allowed subscribers to play music that they owned, borrowed, or had previously purchased over the 
Internet.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  The court 
did not uphold the defense’s argument that the service of MP3.com merely allowed subscribers to 
“space shift” sound recordings that they owned without carrying around physical CDs because the 
service was neither transformative nor productive.  See id. at 351.  According to the court, the use of a 
different medium did not render the use transformative.  Id; see also Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 
150 F.3d 104, 108–09 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair use defense by the operator of a service that 
retransmitted copyrighted radio broadcasts over telephone lines); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television 
Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 994–95 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the fair use defense by television news 
agencies that copied copyrighted news footage and retransmitted it to news organizations). 
 24. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001). 
 25. Id. at 1022.  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit also accepted the district court’s conclusion that 
plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the vicarious copyright infringement 
claim.  Id. at 1023-24. 
 26. See, e.g., Kristina Groennings, Costs and Benefits of the Recording Industry’s Litigation 
Against Individuals, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 573 (2005) (“The [recording] industry’s victory in 
Napster was fleeting as publicity over the issue increased awareness of P2P technology and users 
flocked to decentralized networks like Grokster and KaZaa, making the tracking of P2P use more 
difficult.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 27. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1037 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
DEPOORTER & VAN HIEL, COPYRIGHT ALERT ENFORCEMENT, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2015)  
2015] COPYRIGHT ALERT ENFORCEMENT 241 
copyright infringing uses and take active steps to that end.28  Adopting the 
inducement standard from patent law,29 the Supreme Court held that copyright 
holders can bring suit against commercial agents who distribute products “with the 
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or 
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.”30  Although the Grokster 
decision renders it more difficult to create a commercially viable business model 
based on infringement, it does not rule out technologies that facilitate online 
copyright infringements in the absence of “active steps . . . taken with the purpose 
of bringing about infringing acts.”31 
To conclude, content industries were unable to prevent the further development 
and distribution of new file sharing and streaming technologies.  As a result, with 
the number of online copyright infringements continuing to skyrocket unabated, the 
entertainment industry was compelled to target individual users of file sharing 
technologies.  This was a historic shift in the focus of copyright piracy enforcement 
since copyright enforcement traditionally has been directed towards commercial 
pirates.32 
A.  FIRST WAVE: THE RECORD INDUSTRY’S SETTLEMENT LETTER CAMPAIGN 
In September 2003, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) 
began sending subpoenas to Internet service providers, demanding the names of 
individuals who were allegedly sharing music on file sharing networks.  The 
lawsuits targeted individuals who stored large amounts of music files in publicly 
accessible folders on their computers.  These cases were settled at an average of 
$1,500–$3,000.33  A second wave of lawsuits followed in October 2003, when the 
RIAA initiated eighty additional lawsuits against individual peer-to-peer file 
sharers.34  Between 2003 and 2007, the recording industry issued over 3,400 
individual lawsuits against users of peer-to-peer file sharing technology.35  In 
November 2004, the movie industry (Motion Picture Artists Association or MPAA) 
joined the fray36 when it launched a barrage of lawsuits against individuals who had 
 
 28. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919. 
 29. Id. at 935 (citing Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1991); Henry v. A. B. Dick 
Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1917); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 75 F. 
1005, 1007–08 (2d Cir. 1896); Rumford Chem. Works v. Hecker, 20 F. Cas. 1342, 1346 (C.C.D. N.J. 
1876) (No. 12,133)). 
 30. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919. 
 31. Id. at 938. 
 32. For an overview, see Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on 
Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831 (2009). 
 33. This average gradually increased to $3000.  Paul Roberts, RIAA Sues 532 ‘John Does’, PC 
WORLD, http://www.pcworld.com/article/114387/article.html [http://perma.cc/P4LK-PANR]. 
 34. RIAA Launches Second Wave of File-Swapper Suits, OUT-LAW NEWS (Oct. 31, 2003), http://
www.out-law.com/page-4029 [http://perma.cc/VK4E-KWX3]. 
 35. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 4, at 4.  
 36. Because the amount of motion pictures being exchanged over peer-to-peer networks had 
increased dramatically in 2004, mainly due to increased broadband width and improved compression 
technologies, the movie industry group decided to no longer sit back.  Bary Alyssas Johnson,  MPAA 
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allegedly shared a substantial number of movies online.37  By June 2005, the 
MPAA had initiated five rounds of lawsuits against individual file traders.38  To 
date, at least 18,000 individuals have received threatening letters from content 
industry organizations.39  In addition, content industries have sent prelitigation 
letters to universities requesting that students come forward to pay a non-negotiable 
settlement amount.40 
The RIAA settlement campaign involved a number of awkward public relations 
incidents that likely contributed to the dwindling of public support for copyright 
enforcement.  For instance, media outlets reported that content industries had 
accused a twelve year old girl in New York, whose mother lived in low income 
housing run by the New York City Housing Authority,41 of copyright infringement, 
as well as an eighty-three year old woman who had died over a month earlier, 
among others.42 
To many observers, the industry’s litigate-or-settle practice reflects an unfair 
power dynamic.  Since alleged infringers so frequently choose to settle in order to 
avoid the expense of litigation, many legal questions remain unanswered.  
According to some, the almost mechanical administration of the settlement 
payments is akin to blackmail, extortion, or harassment.43  Moreover, the 
legitimacy of the litigation effort is undermined by a lack of comprehensive 
application.  Due to the large number of offenders, any particular instance of 
individual enforcement seems random, creating a perception that unlucky 
individuals have been chosen arbitrarily in a litigation lottery. 
 
Anti-Piracy Lawsuits Target Individuals, PCMAG (Aug. 29, 2005), 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1853573,00.asp [http://perma.cc/SV79-SGS]; see, e.g., Press 
Release, Motion Picture Assoc. of Am. (MPAA), Motion Picture industry Takes Action Against Indiana 
Internet Thief (Jan. 27, 2006). 
 37. Hollywood Sues Alleged File Swappers, MSNBC (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/6504024/#.Vkjtp66rSu4 [http://perma.cc/FWL8-ENGQ]. 
 38. See Thomas Mennecke, MPAA Launches New Round of Lawsuits, SLYCK (June 3, 2005), 
http://www.slyck.com/story816_MPAA_Launches_New_Round_of_Lawsuits [http://perma.cc/7XN2-
ZRHL].  
 39. Id. 
 40. See Press Release, RIAA, 23 New Schools to Receive Latest Round of RIAA Pre-Lawsuit 
Letters (July 18, 2007) (“In the sixth wave of this new initiative, the RIAA this week sent letters in the 
following quantities to 23 schools who are receiving letters for the first time.”), http://tech-
insider.org/internet/research/2007/0718.html [http://perma.cc/7Z22-8NKJ]; see, e.g., Nick 
Semenkovich, RIAA Pre-Litigation Letters Sent to MIT, THE TECH (May 8, 2007), 
http://tech.mit.edu/V127/N24/riaa.html [https://perma.cc/4LRB-KJFM?type=source]. 
 41. See John Borland, RIAA Settles with 12-Year-Old Girl, CNET (Sept. 9, 2003), http://
www.cnet.com/news/riaa-settles-with-12-year-old-girl [http://perma.cc/N88M-SDEV]. 
 42. Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, THE REGISTER (Feb. 5, 2005), http://
www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaa_sues_the_dead/ [http://perma.cc/KL9Z-BTY4]. 
  43. QJ Staff, The Anti-Anti-Piracy Campaign: Consumers Electronic Association Tells RIAA To 
Stop Harassing People, QUICKJUMP GAMING NETWORK (Apr. 27, 2006), http://www.qj.net/qjnet/apple/
the-anti-anti-piracy-campaign-cea-tells-riaa-to-stop-harassing-people.html. But see Justin Hughes, On 
the Logic of Suing One’s Customers and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725, 729-31 (2005) (finding that suing college students can be a financially 
self-sustaining long term enforcement strategy that is unlikely to backfire since the settlement lawsuits 
by industry groups are not associated by the public with individual record labels or movie studios).  
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B.  SECOND WAVE: THE STATUTORY DAMAGE AWARDS  
In 2008, a few individuals refused the settlement offers issued by the RIAA.  
Although the threatening letters sent by the RIAA routinely claimed that damage 
awarded by the courts could run up to $150,000, this claim had never been tested in 
court.  In the ensuing litigation, an initial concern was the requisite proof of 
dissemination of a copyrighted work.  Although it can easily be demonstrated that, 
at one time, a file sharer had made a file accessible to the public, it is very difficult 
technically to provide evidence of how many times others had actually downloaded 
the particular file.44  Courts ultimately decided that dissemination could be 
presumed on the basis of accessibility.45  The next issue concerned the alleged harm 
caused by an individual accused of file sharing.46  While it is hard to estimate the 
overall impact of file sharing on the revenue base of the entertainment industries,47 
it is even more difficult to discern the precise damage imposed by file sharing.48  
Fortunately for copyright holders, the Copyright Act does not require right holders 
to provide evidence of actual damages in all circumstances.49  Copyright holders 
 
 44. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 45. See id. at 1219 (holding that liability for violation of the exclusive right of distribution 
requires actual dissemination). 
 46. Determining the actual harm from downloading is complex because it involves questions that 
are very hard to access empirically, including:  (1) how many times in total a file in a user’s publicly 
accessible folder has been downloaded on a peer-to-peer network; and (2) how many of those 
downloads have displaced actual sales that would have taken place otherwise. 
 47. Some studies, for instance, contest the claim that file sharing has a positive impact on music 
industry sales.  See, e.g., Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record 
Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2007); Andy McCue, Study: Falling CD Sales Can’t 
Be Blamed on P2P, CNET (June 21, 2005), http://www.cnet.com/news/study-falling-cd-sales-cant-be-
blamed-on-p2p/ [http://perma.cc/4KSX-L9AH] (discussing study that found that file sharing has no 
negative impact on CD sales).  But see Stan Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain 
Destruction?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2006) (presenting evidence that file sharing diminishes recording 
industry revenues).  For an overview of the empirical work, see Stan Liebowitz, Economists Examine 
File Sharing and Music Sales, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 145 
(Gerhard Illing and Martin Peitz eds., 2006).  
 48. For instance, in order to estimate the harm imposed by one file in a publically accessible 
folder, one needs to gather information about:  (1) the amount of times that the file was downloaded; and 
(2) how many of these downloads caused the individual not to buy the song through legally available 
alternatives.  Such information is simply not available.  Torrent technologies complicate the former 
because any act of downloading captures fragmented parts from any number of different users.  For a 
general explanation of the operation of peer-to-peer networks, see Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 679 (2003).  
 49. Beginning in 1790, the first Congress enacted the original Federal Copyright Act.  The 
original purpose of statutory damages was to provide a minimum award to copyright owners because of 
the difficulty of measuring actual damages and profits.  See Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory 
Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 
273 (2009).  A fundamental underpinning of Congress’s enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976 was its 
concern with potentially excessive statutory awards.  Congress attempted to circumvent such a result via 
novel rhetorical explication in the 1976 Act.  Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages 
in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 453 (2009).  However, 
as Samuelson and Wheatland point out, Congress didn’t limit anything and only exacerbated critics’ 
unease.  Id.  In pertinent part, Samuelson and Wheatland argue that the 1976 Copyright Act’s enactment 
has not had the desired impact Congress anticipated with such unintended consequences recently 
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can elect to apply statutory damages at any time during the litigation50 and, as it 
turns out, courts are willing to apply statutory damage provisions quite liberally.51  
In one instance, a defendant was ordered to pay $222,000 in statutory damages for 
sharing twenty-four songs online.52  In another case, a jury levied $675,000 in 
damages for sharing thirty songs.53  The Copyright Act of 1976 made these large 
monetary awards possible by changing the calculation of awards from “per 
infringement” to “per infringed work”.54  Moreover, courts adapted a broad 
interpretation of willful infringement, which in turn enhances the potential statutory 
award.55  Of course, the generous application of statutory awards certainly bolsters 
the deterrent effect of the entertainment industry’s litigation approach.56 
The six-figure statutory damage awards for non-commercial copyright 
infringements, as exemplified in Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset and Sony BMG 
v. Tenebaum, have been met with surprise57 and hostility.58  Commentators have 
 
evidenced in the latest statutory damage awards in P2P file sharing cases.  Id. 
 50. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).  The 1976 Act limits the availability of statutory damages to 
copyright holders who register their works.  If an infringement was committed willfully, the court may 
increase the award of damages to a sum of $150,000. 
 51. See supra notes 48–50. 
 52. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated this amount after a second and third jury trial 
had set willful statutory damages at $1.92 million and $1.5 million, respectively.  See Capitol Records, 
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2012); Capitol Records v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. 
Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 2010); see also David Kravetz, Jury in RIAA Trial Slaps $2 Million Fine on 
Jammie Thomas, WIRED (June 18, 2009), http://www.wired.com/2009/06/riaa-jury-slaps-2-million-fine-
on-jammie-thomas/ [http://perma.cc/XE8F-RU4E].  
 53. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Joel Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 2011); see Dave 
Itzkoff, Student Fined $675,000 in Downloading Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2009, 12:34 PM), http://
artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/ judge-rules-student-is-liable-in-music-download-case/ [http://
perma.cc/8P4S-53QJ]. 
 54. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 49.   
 55. Kate Cross, David v. Goliath: How the Record Industry is Winning Substantial Judgments 
Against Individuals for Illegally Downloading Music, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1031, 1038 (2010) (“If one 
song on iTunes costs ninety-nine cents to purchase, then a judgment awarding $80,000 for one song is 
not only grossly disproportionate but ‘obviously unreasonable by any measure.’”). 
 56. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 49.  
 57. COPYRIGHTS & CAMPAIGNS, http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2009/06/sony-
bmg-attorney-we-were-shocked-by.html (June 20, 2009) (noting that an executive at Sony said, “We 
were shocked,” about the verdict) (cited in Colin Morrissey, Behind The Music: Determining The 
Relevant Constitutional Standard For Statutory Damages In Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3059, 3062 (2010)). 
 58.      Daniel Kreps, Richard Marx “Ashamed” He's Linked to $1.92 Million RIAA Fine Against 
Minnesota Mom, ROLLING STONE: ROCK & ROLL DAILY (June 24, 2009), 
http://www.rapidbeatpromotions.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-1387.html (discussing the opinion of 
Richard Marx, whose songs Thomas-Rasset distributed); Ernesto, Moby: The RIAA Needs to Disbanded, 
TORRENT FREAK (June 20, 2009), https://torrentfreak.com/moby-the-riaa-needs-to-be-disbanded-
090620/ (The musician Moby noted, “I don’t know, but ‘it’s better to be feared than respected’ doesn’t 
seem like such a sustainable business model when it comes to consumer choice.”).  Upon reducing the 
reward from $2 million to $222,000 on remand, the court in Capitol Records v. Thomas stated that it 
“would be remiss if it did not take this opportunity to implore Congress to amend the Copyright Act to 
address liability and damages in peer-to-peer network cases . . . .  [I]t would be a farce to say that a 
single mother's acts of using Kazaa are the equivalent, for example, to the acts of global financial firms 
illegally infringing on copyrights in order to profit in the securities market.”  Capitol Records Inc. v. 
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008). 
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been quick to note that these awards extend well beyond the financial means of the 
single mother and graduate student involved in these respective cases.  As applied 
to file-sharing, statutory damage awards have been criticized as being 
disproportionate and excessive.59  Some argue that the punitive nature of the 
awards is inopportune because Congress intended the statutory damage framework 
to merely substitute for actual damages.60  It has been stated also that statutory 
damage awards in copyright actions should be subject to additional scrutiny, since 
substantive due process protections prohibit grossly excessive awards.61  Others 
suggest that, given recent developments, statutory damage law should be reformed 
to incorporate a distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
infringements.62  Generally, criticism on the application of statutory damages in 
file-sharing litigation reflects a concern with a lack of balance between the 
entertainment industry’s chosen means and ends.63  Public disapproval of the 
litigation campaign is illustrated perhaps most vividly by online initiatives that seek 
to subsidize the settlement payment of unlucky defendants.64 
C.  THIRD WAVE: THE COPYRIGHT ALERT SYSTEM 
In 2011, content industries changed gears and adopted a new strategy.  At the 
behest of the Obama and Cuomo administrations,65 the largest Internet service 
providers (SBC, AT&T, Comcast, Verizon, CSC, and Time Warner Cable) entered 
into a Memorandum of Understanding with the major entertainment industries and 
 
 59.     Cam Barker, Grossly Excessive Penalties in the Battle Against Illegal File-Sharing, 83 TEX. 
L. REV. 525 (2004); Pamela Samuelson & Ben Sheffner, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory 
Damages Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53 (2009); Peter S. Menell, 
This American Copyright Life: Reflections on Re-Equilibrating Copyright for the Internet Age, 61 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 235, 336, 371 (2014) (“[D]eterrent enforcement through statutory damages . . 
. is largely counter-productive in a technological age in which consumers can easily circumvent content 
markets.”); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 220, 234 (1997) (“[R]eliance upon threats of punishment to enforce 
intellectual property laws is a strategy that is likely to be ineffective.”).  
 60. Samuelson & Sheffner, supra note 59, at 64–65; see also Colin Morrissey, Note, Behind the 
Music: Determining the Relevant Constitutional Standard for Statutory Damages in Copyright 
Infringement Lawsuits, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 3059 (2010) (arguing in favor of due process evaluation). 
 61. Barker supra note 59, at 529. 
 62. Anna Cronk, The Punishment Doesn’t Fit the Crime—Why and How Congress Should Revise 
the Statutory Copyright Damages Provision for Noncommercial Infringements on Peer-to-Peer File-
Sharing Networks, 39 SW. U. L. REV. 181, 195 (2009). 
 63. See Daniel Reynolds, The RIAA Litigation War on File Sharing and Alternatives More 
Compatible with Public Morality, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 977 (2008). 
 64. See, e.g., US file-sharer refuses donations, BBC (Aug. 3, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
technology/8177285.stm [http://perma.cc/4VXT-Z54E] (reporting that Joel Tenenbaum received 
donations to compensate for his legal expenses).  
 65. Salil K. Mehra & Marketa Trimble, Secondary Liability, ISP Immunity, and Incumbent 
Entrenchment, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 685, 703 (2014) (“Though presented as a form of self-regulation, the 
CAS seems in part a product of informal guidance by government officials.  The Governor of New 
York, Andrew Cuomo, facilitated the negotiations, and the Obama Administration endorsed the plan, 
reportedly after Justice Department officials informally vetted the program.”). 
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firms to implement a Copyright Alert System.66 
Taking a page from France’s HADOPI system,67 CAS employs a “graduated” 
approach to copyright enforcement.  In this system, copyright owners and ISPs 
escalate sanctions with each additional infringement notification.  Copyright 
infringement alerts work their way up from educational messages (initial two 
notices) to messages that require acknowledgment (third and fourth notices) and 
conclude with two final notices that include mitigation measures.  At their 
discretion, ISPs can take the following mitigation measures:  reducing a 
subscriber’s transmission speed, moving a subscriber down to a lower-tier service, 
redirecting the subscriber to a landing page for copyright “instruction” until the 
subscriber contacts customer service, and/or temporarily suspending Internet 
access.68  After observing the final mitigation phase, ISPs are under no obligation 
to keep sending alerts, but must continue to track and report notices received for the 
subscriber in question.  The entire system resets for every subscriber at the end of 
each twelve-month cycle. 
By closely monitoring peer-to-peer file sharing sites, the CAS inspects what 
subscribers are downloading and matches the file signature (called a “hash”) 
against a set of known signatures of pirated files.  When an infringement has been 
discovered, the ISP is informed of the violation.  Subsequently, the ISP relays this 
information to the alleged infringer’s email account that is registered with the 
ISP.69 
A user who opposes a CAS warning may request a hearing before the affiliated 
reviewers of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).  There are six 
predefined grounds available from which to challenge a CAS warning: 
misidentification of account, unauthorized use of account (limited to a one-time 
citation), authorization from the copyright holder, fair use, misidentification of file, 
and use of works published before 1923.70 
As might be expected, the CAS has received its fair share of criticism.71  Critics 
 
 66. Industry associations involved include the Independent Film and Television Alliance (IFTA) 
and the American Association of Independent Musicians (A2IM); Recording Industry Association of 
American members Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and EMI 
Music; and Motion Picture Association of America members Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures, 
Paramount Pictures, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal 
Studios, and Warner Brothers Entertainment. 
 67. Greg Sandoval, RIAA Gives Thumbs Up to France’s Three Strikes Law, CNET (Apr. 8, 2009, 
2:28 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/riaa-gives-thumbs-up-to-frances-three-strike-law/ [http://
perma.cc/R8TM-TG6P].  On October 22, 2009, the Constitutional Council of France approved the 
HADOPI law or Creation and Internet Law (« Loi favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création 
sur Internet »), including a controversial “three-strike” procedure which requires Internet service 
providers to suspend the Internet service of the connection owner, as opposed to the actual accused 
infringer, for a period between two months to one year.  The accused owner is blacklisted and third party 
Internet service providers are prevented from providing the accused owner an Internet connection.  See 
Eric Pfanner, France Approves Wide Crackdown on Net Piracy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/technology/23net.html?_r=0. 
 68. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 11.  
 69. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 11. 
 70.  See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 11. 
 71. Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style:“Six Strikes” Measured Against Five 
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routinely comment on the lack of transparency during the closed-door negotiations 
and formation of the Memorandum of Agreement,72 the lack of independence of the 
advisory board,73 and potential free speech concerns.74  Overall, however, 
commentators consider CAS a welcome development that could help bridge the 
gap between prevailing copy norms and copyright law.75 
In its first annual report, the nonprofit Center for Copyright Information (CCI) 
reported that CAS sent more than 1.3 million Copyright Alerts to account holders 
in the first ten months of operation.  The vast majority of the notifications delivered 
to account holders (more than 70%) were limited to the initial educational stages, 
with less than 3% of the notifications reaching the final mitigation stage.  
According to survey data gathered by the CCI, the majority of surveyed users 
reported that they would stop their copyright infringing activities upon receiving an 
alert, while 62% of respondents believe that “it is never acceptable to engage in 
infringing activity.”  Various partners to the CAS have been quick to tout its 
accomplishments, stating that the CAS meets the combined goals of “being 
respectful of the consumers,” while remaining an effective means of informing the 
public about the various legitimate alternatives available in the marketplace.76 
 
Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 6 (2012) (evaluating strengths and 
weaknesses of the CAS); Rebecca Giblin, Evaluating Graduated Response, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 147 
(2014) (international comparison of graduated response systems); Daniel Lieberman, A Homerun for 
Three Strikes Law: Graduated Response and Its Bid to Save Copyright, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
223, 257 (2012) (suggesting that a lack of public oversight will reduce scrutiny on when and how many 
notifications to send out).  For discussion on private enforcement of copyright more generally, see Ben 
Depoorter & Robert Kirk Walker, Copyright False Positives, 89(1) NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319 (2013) 
(discussing enforcement incentives of copyright holders). 
 72. Several commentators have criticized the government’s role in brokering CAS behind closed 
doors.  See Derek E. Bambauer, The New American Way of Censorship, ARIZ. ATT’Y 32, 36 (Mar. 2013) 
(informal roles lack opportunity for judicial reviews); Josh Blackman, The 1st Amendment, 2nd 
Amendment, and 3D Printed Guns, 81 TENN. L. REV. 479 (2014); Salil K. Mehra & Marketa Trimble, 
Secondary Liability, ISP Immunity, and Incumbent Entrenchment, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 685 (2014); see 
also Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 904–05 (2012) (raising free 
speech concerns); M. Flaim, Copyright Conspiracy: How the New Copyright Alert System May Violate 
the Sherman Act, 2 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 142 (2012) (raising antitrust concerns); Margot 
Kaminski, Copyright Crime and Punishment: The First Amendment’s Proportionality Problem, 73 MD. 
L. REV. 587 (2014) (also raising free speech concerns). 
 73. Bridy, supra note 71, at 57; see also Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement 
Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 695 (2011). 
 74. Peter Groh, Through A Router Darkly: How New American Copyright Enforcement Initiatives 
May Hinder Economic Development, Net Neutrality and Creativity, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL’Y 1, 2–3 
(2012) (raising free speech concerns). 
 75. Timothy L. Yim, Normative Avoision: Revising the Copyright Alert System to Circumvent 
Normative Backlash, 6 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1 (2014) (describing how CAS “deftly sidestepped 
the normative backlash dilemma”); see also, supra note 13. 
 76. Comment by CCI Board Co-Chair Steve Marks of RIAA, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT 
INFORMATION (May 28, 2014), http://www.copyrightinformation.org/press-release/cci-provides-first-
copyright-alert-system-progress-report-highlighting-initial-accomplishments/ [http://perma.cc/95BL-
PCEM].  
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II.  ENFORCING AGAINST NORMS 
It has been bumpy road for copyright enforcement in the digital era.  The vast 
scale of copyright infringing activities that has accompanied the growth of file-
sharing technologies, social networks, and broadband Internet has decreased 
revenues for traditionally copyright-based industries.77  This created a vexing 
dilemma for copyright holders:  either aggressively ramp up enforcement against 
infringers78—notwithstanding widespread public condemnation of the practice79—
or face the potentially devastating effects of rampant online piracy.  The copyright-
holders chose the former. 
Despite a decade of aggressive enforcement, however, entertainment industries 
observed that online copyright infringements had not been reduced satisfactorily.  
Moreover, thanks in part to the severe tactics of the copyright enforcement 
campaign, public condemnation of copyright industries has risen dramatically.  The 
more salient and publicized features of the RIAA settlement campaign and 
statutory damage awards have clearly undermined the legitimacy of copyright 
enforcement in the mind of the public.80  
Was the music industry foolish to ignore the normative reactions to its 
enforcement effort?  In order to break the momentum of the tidal wave of online 
infringements on peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, music industry representatives 
realized that they had to impose credible sanctions that would compensate for the 
low probability that any individual infringer would face repercussions.  This 
economic calculation of deterrence neglected some important psychological 
considerations, however.  Rather than portray them as lawbreakers, media outlets 
began to depict targeted infringers as unlucky scapegoats forced to atone for the 
wrongs of an entire generation.  It is clear that negative attitudes towards copyright 
 
 77. See, e.g., Total Music Sales 1999–2008, CLICKITTICKET (2011), http://
www.clickitticket.com/MoneyMusicandPiracy.asp [http://perma.cc/E86Y-JA65]; Michael D. Smith & 
Rahul Telang, Assessing the Academic Literature Regarding the Impact of Media Piracy on Sales (Aug. 
19, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132153 (arguing that the vast majority of empirical studies find that 
piracy harms media sales).  But see Joel Waldfogel, The Four P’s of Digital Distribution in the Internet 
Era: Piracy, Pie-Splitting, and Pipe Control, 7 REV. OF ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3 (2010) 
(arguing that new technology requires media firms to create new methods for revenue sharing). 
 78. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 901 (2012) (upholding 
damages of $222,000 for infringement of twenty-four songs); Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 
721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 116-17 (D. Mass. 2010) (reducing jury statutory damage award of $22,500 per work 
down to $2,250 on the grounds that the jury award was grossly excessive in violation of the Due Process 
Clause), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding the constitutionality of 
statutory damages for copyright violations and remanding for reconsideration of the remittitur motion), 
on remand, 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1902 (D.Mass. Aug. 23, 2012) (reinstating initial jury award). 
 79. See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251 (2011).  On the 
dynamics of litigation and backlash effects, see generally Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113(3) 
COLUM. L. REV. 817 (2013) (describing litigation strategies that anticipate and capitalize on public 
backlash). 
 80. FindLaw Survey Reveals RIAA Lawsuits Unpopular with Americans, FINDLAW (June 29, 
2011), http://company.findlaw.com/press-center/2004/findlaw-survey-reveals-riaa-lawsuits-unpopular-
with-americans.html#sthash.69SETR9y.dpu [http://perma.cc/E9GK-TM3M] (“A majority of Americans 
say the music industry should not sue people who illegally download music off the Internet.”). 
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law do not serve the interests of copyright owners.  First, social psychologists have 
shown that legal obedience is “morality-based” and/or “legitimacy-based.”81  
Individuals tend to observe laws more easily when they believe that it is the right 
thing to do.82  Infringements are more likely if the public questions the purpose and 
mandate of copyright law.  Moreover, individuals are more likely to disregard legal 
commands if they believe that the law is out of touch or unjust.  Some individuals 
will ignore the risks of noncompliance more easily and some may even disobey the 
legal rule as a matter of principle. 
In such polarized environments, the stringent enforcement of contentious laws 
may actually have the unintended effect of reinforcing and strengthening the belief 
that that a legal rule is unjust, especially if legal sanctions are perceived as 
excessive relative to the infringing behavior.83  In the context of tax compliance, for 
example, several studies document that stringent enforcement measures often 
backfire, inducing increased tax evasion.84  Other notable historical examples 
include the failure of the Prohibition era,85 and more recently the War on Drugs.86  
 
 81. For instance, in the context of tax compliance, there exists an extensive literature on the 
assumption that “social motivations rather than mere selfishness . . . affect taxpaying behavior, such as 
ethical concerns and social norms, perceptions of fairness and legitimacy.”  Michael Wenzel, Motivation 
or Rationalization? Causal Relations Between Ethics, Norms and Tax Compliance, 26 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 491, 492 (2005) (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990)); see also John 
S. Carroll, Compliance with the Law: A Decision-Making Approach to Taxpaying, 11 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 319, 319–35 (1987) (applying decision-making models to tax law); Simon James, et al., 
Developing a Tax Compliance Strategy for Revenue Services, 55 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION 158–64 (2001). 
 82. TYLER, supra note 81, at 3–4. 
 83. In the context of criminal law, William Stuntz applies the term “self-defeating crimes” to 
describe situations where prosecution can work against the very norms on which they rest, causing 
“popular norms . . . to move in the opposite direction from the law.”  William Stuntz, Self-Defeating 
Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2000) (suggesting that misguided enforcement priorities can 
inadvertently shift public support away the underlying laws).  For a theoretical model, see Francesco 
Parisi & Georg Von Wangenheim, Legislation and Countervailing Effects from Social Norms, in THE 
EVOLUTION AND DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS 1, 9 (C. Schubert and G. Von Wagenheim eds., 2006) 
(describing a cycle of opinion formation whereby public acts of disobedience and protest undermine the 
legitimacy of legislation, which leads to further opposition). 
 84. John Caroll, A Psychological Approach to Deterrence: The Evaluation of Crime 
Opportunities, 36 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1512 (1978); Harold Grasmick & Donald 
Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 17 J. 
OF CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980); Kent Smith, Integrating Three Perspectives on 
Noncompliance: A Sequential Decision Model, 17 CRIM. JUSTICE & BEHAVIOR 350 (1990).  See 
generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003) (providing overview of various studies on norms in the area of tax 
compliance). 
 85. KENNETH ALLSOP, THE STORY OF CHICAGO’S PROHIBITION ERA (1970) (describing causes of 
success and failure in enforcement campaign on bootlegging); LARRY ENGELMANN, INTEMPERANCE: 
THE LOST WAR AGAINST LIQUOR (1979); ANDREW SINCLAIR, ERA OF EXCESS, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
THE PROHIBITION MOVEMENT (1962); Joseph Gusfield, Prohibition: The Impact of Political 
Utopianism, in CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA: THE 1920S 257, 257 
(John Braeman ed., 1968); Harry G. Levine and Craig Reinarman, From Prohibition to Regulation: 
Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, 69(3) THE MILBANK QUARTERLY 461 (1991). 
 86. David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and Racial 
Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 237 (1994) (“[A]fter the expenditure of billions of dollars on a 
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In this regard, adverse normative reactions to the copyright industry’s settlement 
letter campaign and the statutory damage cases may help explain the continued 
persistence of copyright infringing behavior despite the increased risk.87 
The CAS represents a clean break with the past.  The CAS is widely understood 
as an attempt to avoid additional adverse public backlash, to rehabilitate respect for 
the once revered music industry, and to mend the gap between prevailing norms 
and copyright law.88  To achieve this agenda, the CAS forsakes punitive and 
compensatory measures altogether.  Instead, the CAS and similar graduated 
response systems in other countries89 employ an information system approach.  By 
sending out millions of infringement notifications in cooperation with major ISPs, 
CAS communicates with copyright infringers on several levels.  First, the copyright 
notifications increase basic copyright awareness and provide information about 
legal alternatives.  Second, the notices put subscribers on alert about copyright 
infringements that have occurred on their network—either by members of the 
household or outsiders.  Third, each alert sends a clear message that Internet 
behavior is being monitored for copyright infringing actions.  This removes the 
impression of online anonymity.  Although the copyright alert system itself does 
not set in motion legal action by copyright holders against infringers, the system 
signals to infringers that that copyright holders have obtained the necessary 
information (IP address) necessary to initiate action if so inclined. 
Industry stakeholders and many academic commentators are optimistic about the 
potential role of copyright information systems.  The system is praised for 
providing a more balanced, less aggressive approach that would avoid backlash, 
while curbing infringements overall.90 
This optimistic perspective fails to acknowledge several important drawbacks of 
copyright information systems.  First, even if the CAS successfully avoids the 
negative reactions of the prior, more punitive approaches to copyright enforcement, 
it is doubtful that installing a copyright information system will bring about more 
positive, pro-copyright attitudes.  As has been documented, online file sharing and 
 
policy built primarily on the coercion and punishment of drugs distributors and users, the War on Drugs 
has failed to reduce significantly, much less eliminate, drugs as a problem in our society.”) (discussing 
negative impact of drugs war policies on constitutional norms and racial equality).  For a historical 
review of the war on drugs, see STAN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A 
FAILED PUBLIC POLICY (1990); JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR WAR ON DRUGS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT 
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2001).   
 87. See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251 (2011). 
 88. Supra note 13. 
 89. For an overview, see Giblin, supra note 71, at 153–80. 
 90. Peter S. Menell, This American Copyright Life: Reflections on Re-Equilibrating Copyright for 
the Internet Age, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 235, 334 (2014) (“It remains to be seen whether this 
approach will achieve its goals, but there can be little doubt that it offers a more balanced approach to 
illegal file-sharing than the mass litigation that unfolded from 2003 through 2008.”); Rachel Storch, 
Copyright Vigilantism, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 453, 468 (2013) (“The program has a variety of 
advantages over traditional enforcement under the Copyright Act . . . .  Copyright holders also benefit 
from avoiding the bad press associated with copyright infringement lawsuits.”); Timothy L. Yim, 
Normative Avoision: Revising the Copyright Alert System to Circumvent Normative Backlash, 6 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1 (2014). 
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illegal streaming have a strong anti-copyright norm component.91  Social science 
scholarship suggests that norms are often quite robust and notoriously difficult to 
manipulate.92  The dynamics of social norms are complex and unpredictable.93  
Once internalized, it is widely understood that noncompliant norms are hard to 
reverse.94  Given the widespread nature of online piracy and the perceived excesses 
of punitive copyright enforcement in the past, it seems unlikely that merely 
abandoning the prior enforcement model can reverse moral intuitions about 
copyright infringing behavior.  While a literature describes how legislators can 
express collective commitments or set collective expectations,95 such conditions are 
notably absent in the context of a privately negotiated information system such as 
CAS.  In light of these observations, the CAS is a risky proposition for copyright 
holders.  If the CAS indeed fails to restore the public image of content industries 
and reverse anti-copyright norms, copyright holders have undermined deterrence 
without obtaining any countervailing benefits. 
Second, instead of improving public attitudes about copyright law, the privacy 
implications of copyright information systems may further damage copyright law’s 
reputation.  Content industries are quick to point out that CAS does not force ISP’s 
into disclosing the identity, names or contact information of infringing subscribers.  
But architects of the copyright information systems overlook an important aspect of 
privacy harms.  In their defense of copyright information systems, content 
industries focus on the absence of so-called “objective” privacy harms, where there 
is an “unanticipated or coerced use of information.”96  But privacy injuries may 
also involve “subjective privacy harms,”97 where there is a perception of unwanted 
 
 91. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, The Law and Norms of File Sharing, 43 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 577, 605–12 (2006) (conducting a survey study); Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social 
Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for File-Sharing 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39, 51 (2004) (noting clash 
between law and social norms about online music sharing); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, 
Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 
549 (2003) (discussing how computer code fosters sharing norms). 
 92. On the internalization of social norms, see Robert C. Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good 
Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000). 
 93. Robert Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and 
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1 (2000) (describing tipping point effects with norms); Dan Kahan, 
Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000) 
(suggesting that gradual approaches are more effective when anti-legal norms are in place); Mark J Roe, 
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996) (describing effect of 
accidental conditions). 
 94. Ben Depoorter, Technology and Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1831, 1867 (2009). 
 95. On the role of laws in shaping community norms and influencing behavior, see Paul 
Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks is Just? Coercive Versus 
Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839 (2000).  When law creates a focal point by expressing 
values that might tip norms to a new equilibrium, this process may create a social norm or internalize a 
normative value.  See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996); Robert D. Cooter, 
Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 585 (1998).  The idea of law as focal point that 
coordinates social expectations among citizens is explored further in Richard H. McAdams, A Focal 
Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000). 
 96. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harms, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1134 (2011). 
 97. These privacy harms are “subjective” in the sense of being internal to the person harmed. 
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observation.98  Such privacy harms involve “unwelcome mental states—anxiety, 
embarrassment, fear—that stem from the belief that one is being watched or 
monitored.”99  Importantly, an unwanted observation need not be actual in order to 
constitute a privacy harm, only perceived or suspected, following from a “the mere 
belief that one is being observed.”100 
Although copyright information systems sidestep the problem of objective 
privacy harms, they likely inflict these more subjective privacy injuries.  Like other 
surveillance systems that intrude on subjective privacy, the CAS involves 
observations that are systematic, part of a plan or pattern that involves “pervasive 
individual monitoring.”101  Such systems disrupt what privacy specialist term 
“episodic solitude”—i.e., the periodic absence of the perception of being 
watched.102  By coopting Internet service providers in the pursuit of more effective 
copyright enforcement, copyright information systems amplify the perception that 
online activities are being monitored.  Individuals can be expected to react 
adversely to this, especially if such privacy harms seem disproportionate to the 
nature of the offense at issue. 
Given these observations, like the earlier enforcement approaches that preceded 
it, the CAS might in fact further widen the gap between noncompliant copy-norms 
and copyright law.  In the next Section we examine our intuitions on the basis of a 
series of survey studies and experiments that span a ten-year period. 
III.  STUDY DESIGN 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
We collected data from two generations of college students in 2011 and 2014–
2015.  Together with data obtained in the 2003 period,103 we study copyright norms 
and online behavior among young college students for a period close to a 
decennium.  This timeline provides insight into potential changes in norms and 
behavior during a period when both copyright related technologies evolved at a 
rapid pace and content industries experimented with a varied set of enforcement 
approaches to combat digital piracy.  In doing so, the current study seeks to 
determine the effectiveness of various approaches to copyright enforcement.  
Moreover, given the wide range of enforcement approaches deployed by the 
 
 98. In a seminal book Alan Westin identified four essential aspects of privacy: (1) solitude; (2) 
intimacy; (3) anonymity; and (4) reserve (“the creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted 
intrusion”).  ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31–32 (1967). 
 99. Calo, supra note 96, at 1144–52 (distinguishing “subjective” and “objective” privacy harms). 
 100. See M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology 
Scholarship, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 809, 842–48 (2010). 
 101. Id. at 1145. 
 102. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 163–64 (2008) (describing the role of 
solitude in daily life); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject As Object, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–28 (2000); Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1640–41 (1999).  
 103. See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251 (2011).   
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entertainment industry, the study also contributes to the empirical literature on law 
enforcement generally. 
To advance our understanding of the interaction between norms and deterrence, 
we explore the dynamics of enforcement on self-reported norm evaluations in the 
context of a survey study and experiment. 
B.  METHODOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES 
Our study applied scenario and vignette methodologies.  Students were unaware 
that the study would be conducted in class the day it was administered.  None of the 
students had taken classes in intellectual property law or copyright law.  To avoid 
underreporting and esteem-based distortions,104 the survey was conducted 
anonymously in a large auditorium with a large seating capacity.  Participants were 
informed that the survey was part of a study on how people respond to copyright 
enforcement.  No financial compensation was offered for participating in the study. 
A total of 455 students participated in experiments conducted in 2011 (n=263) 
and 2014 (n=108) and 2015 (n=84).  We employed the same materials and 
procedures across all studies. 
The study consisted of three consecutive parts. 
1.  First Part 
In the first part of the study, we examined: (1) how respondents obtain 
copyrighted content; (2) the personal norms and perceived social norms regarding 
copyright infringements; (3) the perceived likelihood of enforcement. 
First, we obtained information about participants’ prior history as consumers of 
digital content and their use of various technologies to obtain such content.  
Specifically, we asked if and how much music or movies participants had obtained 
by way of various technologies, including Napster, Grokster, Kazaa, Vuze, The 
Pirate Bay, Rapidshare, Bittorent platforms, or “any other online technology that 
enables downloading music without paying for it.”105  We also inquired whether and 
to what extent respondents had shared music or movies with friends by copying 
 
 104. Colin Camerer, & Ernst Fehr, Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using Studyal 
Games: A Guide for Social Scientists, in FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY (J. Henrich, R. Boyd, S. 
Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, R. McElreath eds. 2004). 
 105.  See survey form, Appendix.  We asked students to “exclude from consideration iTunes store 
or other licensed downloading sites.”  In a 2015 extension of the study (n=84) we included additional 
questions that distinguished between unlicensed peer-to-peer downloading and unauthorized online 
streaming.  Questions relating to unauthorized streaming included:  “Have you ever streamed TV shows 
or movies from the Internet from sites that might be unauthorized/operate without licenses from the 
copyright owner?”; “If so, how many TV SHOWS AND MOVIES have you streamed from these sites 
(estimate)?”; “Do you currently (in the past 3 months) STREAM music or movies on/from sites that 
might be unauthorized/operate without licenses from the copyright owner?”; and, “In your estimation, 
what percentage of the students who violate copyright law by watching content on STREAMING SITES 
will eventually be caught?”  Because the results are similar across 2014 peer-to-peer and 2015 streaming 
studies, we will focus primarily on the results of the 2014 survey.   
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from each other’s computer or iPod. 
We obtained information regarding current online behavior by asking whether 
participants had experience with technologies that provide unlicensed content from 
the Internet within the past three months and whether they currently were 
subscribed to any licensed music or movie platforms or download services 
(including but not limited to iTunes Store, Netflix, Spotify, Amazon Prime, etc.). 
The answers to these survey questions allowed us to put together a profile of 
each respondent, enabling us to:  (1) distinguish between frequent-, infrequent-, and 
non-infringers of copyright; (2) identify respondents with file-sharing experience in 
the past who are now exclusively purchasing content through legal avenues; (3) 
observe intentions to engage in future copyright infringements. 
Next, we surveyed:  (a) the perceived likeliness of copyright enforcement; (b) 
the personal norms and perceived social norms regarding copyright infringements; 
and (c) current and intended future copyright infringing behavior online. 
In order to measure these attitudes and assumptions, we presented participants 
with a list of statements.  The following items (dependent variables) were included 
in the study: 
(a) Moral Perception of Copyright Infringements in Part 1.  Two statements and 
questions gauged respondents’ attitudes toward copyright law and copyright 
infringements:  (1) “I feel that it is morally wrong to use file-sharing technology to 
download music without paying”; (2) “The use of file-sharing technology to 
download movies without paying is morally condemnable.”  An additional 
statement examined public attitudes:  (3) “Do people in general think that 
downloading music without paying for it is morally correct?”  And one statement 
probed into the attitudes of the peer group:  (4) “How likely is it that your friends 
and peers will disapprove when you tell them that you download music on file-
sharing networks?” 
(b) Perception of Copyright Enforcement in Part 1.  Four questions assessed the 
participants’ evaluation of the effectiveness and likeliness of enforcement with 
regard to their own and others’ potential copyright infringing behavior online:  (1) 
“In your estimation, how many file-sharers that continue to download on a daily 
basis will face repercussions?”; (2) “In your estimation, what are the chances of 
getting detected and prosecuted for file-sharing?”;106 (3) “In your estimation, what 
are the chances of getting detected and receiving a letter from your Internet service 
provider or the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) about your file-
sharing?”; (4) “In your estimation, what percentage of the students who violate 
copyright law by downloading music on file-sharing networks will eventually be 
caught?”  Additionally, we verified whether a respondent had “received a 
Copyright Infringement Alert letter from their Internet Service Provider.”107 
 
 106. Respondents were requested to indicate the perceived likelihood on a scale between “Zero, 
Less than 1/million, Less than 1/10000, About 1/1000, About 1/100, About 1/10, About 1/2, Almost 
certain.” 
 107. We included this question at the end to verify whether a respondent’s perception of 
enforcement might be affected by this experience.  Due to small sample bias, receiving a CAS 
notification likely induces higher estimation of likeliness of enforcement. 
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(c) Future Copyright Infringing Behavior in Part 1.  Four items measured 
respondents’ current and future online consumption of copyrighted content:  (1) “In 
[the coming year],108 how likely is it that you will download music from file-
sharing platforms or technologies (not including iTunes and other licensed 
download stores)?”; (2) “Your favorite new artist is about to release his/her/their 
new album.  You receive a text message from a friend that the new album is 
available on the file-sharing platform that you use.  How likely is it that you will 
download the album rather than wait and buy the album when it will be released?”; 
(3) “A friend shows you a file-sharing site that has all the music albums that you 
ever wanted.  Everyone on the site seems to have the same music taste as you do.  
How many songs will you download?” 
Overall, Part 1 of our study provides a bird’s-eye view of the online copyright 
landscape over the past four years.  First, these questions enable us to verify how 
copyright infringing behavior is affected by deterrent (i.e., likeliness of 
enforcement), normative (i.e., perceived immorality of file-sharing) or pragmatic 
(i.e., availability of legal alternatives) factors.  Second, the data allows us to 
observe the evolution of infringing behavior over time.  To that end, the questions 
provide a timeline of past and present behavior and norms among students in 2011 
and 2014.  Additionally, in order to evaluate the recent towards online streaming, 
we conducted an additional study in 2015 that applied the same questions to online 
streaming.  This second survey also increased the amount of CAS recipients in the 
sample population.109  Finally, we are able to extend the timeline back to 2003 with 
data obtained from identical survey questions presented to undergraduate students 
in that year.110 
2.  Second Part 
After all respondents had completed the survey part of the study, Part 2 
randomly assigned our participants with a vignette that described a current (past) 
enforcement approach to online copyright piracy.  By “priming” respondents with 
vignettes that described enforcement systems, the subsequent series of questions 
examined if and how students react to various copyright enforcement modalities 
and compare the effects of various enforcement regimes.111. 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of six groups.  We presented each 
group with a newspaper clipping from a “recent article in a major American 
 
 108. The dates were 2011–2012 and 2014–2015, respectively for the 2011 and 2014 studies. 
 109.  See supra note 107.  Moreover, in this separate study we removed the survey questions part 
and started with the scenario vignettes of Part 2 instead.  This allowed us to check for inadvertent 
priming effects of the survey itself, separate from the vignette scenario.  As we expected, the opening 
survey questions do not have a significant effect on the results in subsequent parts of the study. 
 110. See Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright 
Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127 (2005). 
 111. Priming is an implicit memory effect, developed in psychology research, where exposure to 
one stimulus influences the response to another stimulus.  See, e.g., Endel Tulving et al., Priming Effects 
in Word-Fragment Completion Are Independent of Recognition Memory, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 336, 336 (1982). 
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newspaper” that described a particular enforcement approach (independent 
variables).  The newspaper clippings were selected to accurately describe the 
various enforcement modalities employed to combat online piracy. 
The first scenario described the original RIAA settlement letter campaign:  “On 
September 8, 2003, the recording industry first sued 261 individuals for sharing 
songs on peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks, kicking off an unprecedented 
legal campaign against the people that should be the recording industry’s best 
customers: music fans.  Since then, the recording industry (Record Industry 
Association of America) has filed, settled, or threatened legal actions against at 
least 30,000 individuals—a random selection from the millions of Americans who 
have used P2P networks.  Lawsuits are filed monthly, and are also supplemented by 
a flood of ‘pre-litigation’ settlement letters designed to extract settlements without 
any need to enter a courtroom.”112 
We also presented to different groups two variations of the RIAA campaign.  
One clipping highlights the random nature of the selection of recipients of 
settlement letters;113 a second newspaper clipping contains the announcement by 
the RIAA that it has decided to abandon the settlement letter strategy and stop 
sending out enforcement notifications.114 
The second scenario recounted the most (in)famous case involving a statutory 
damage award for file-sharing:  “Jammie Thomas-Rasset, the woman who has been 
fighting the recording industry (Record Industry Association of America) over 24 
songs she illegally downloaded and shared online four years ago, has lost in court. 
A court decided today that she was liable for $1.5 million in copyright infringement 
damages to Capitol Records, or $62,500 for each song she illegally shared in April 
2006.”115 
Additionally, we presented a second group of respondents (n=46) with a similar 
scenario that also described how, in a later stage, the court reduced the award 
substantially.116 
The third enforcement scenario described the new Copyright Alert System:  
“This month, several major Internet service providers, including Verizon, Comcast, 
AT&T and Time Warner Cable, agreed to help record labels identify Internet users 
who downloaded copyrighted content illicitly, warn them about the piracy and 
punish recalcitrant abusers.  Under the agreement, the Internet providers would 
send up to four warning letters to owners of accounts suspected of pirating content.  
 
 112. RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2008), 
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later [http://perma.cc/32LB-KRHU].  The language of 
this Article was edited to provide a more detailed and factual description for the purposes of the 
scenario. 
 113. Steven Musil, Jammie Thomas Hit with $1.5 Million Verdict, CNET (Nov. 3, 2010), http://
www.cnet.com/news/jammie-thomas-hit-with-1-5-million-verdict/ [http://perma.cc/7EBQ-Z5MN] 
(“Earlier this year, the judge reduced the amount to $54,000.”). 
 114. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J. (Dec 19, 
2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122966038836021137 [http://perma.cc/7EBQ-Z5MN]. 
 115.  Musil, supra note 113. 
 116. The instructions provide as follows:  “However, CNET reports that a judge has now cut that 
fee to $54,000.” 
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If illegal downloads continued, the Internet service providers could take a range of 
punitive measures—redirecting users to a landing page with material on copyright 
abuse, throttling their Internet speeds, possibly cutting their broadband 
connections.”117 
A fourth enforcement scenario explained the recent development of the private 
enforcement model known as copyright trolling,118 whereby individuals acquire 
copyrights in order to gain commercial profit by means of copyright enforcement:  
“At least 23,000 file sharers soon will likely get notified they are being sued for 
downloading the latest music album by [name omitted] in what has become the 
single largest illegal-BitTorrent-downloading case in U.S. history.  A federal judge 
in the case has agreed to allow the U.S. Copyright Group to subpoena internet 
service providers to find out the identity of everybody who had illegally 
downloaded the album—meaning the number of defendants is likely to 
dramatically increase as new purloiners are discovered.  Once an ISP gets the 
subpoena, it usually notifies the account holder that his or her subscriber 
information is being turned over to the Copyright Group, which last year pioneered 
the practice of suing BitTorrent downloaders in the United States.  Subpoenas are 
expected to go out this week.”119 
Although every respondent might have different experiences with or knowledge 
about the various enforcement regimes, Part 2 sought to prime respondents on a 
particular regime in order to clarify and make more salient the details of that 
regime.  After reading their respective randomly assigned enforcement scenario, 
participants again completed a survey containing some of the items from the first 
study:  anti-copyright norms, the evaluation of music industry enforcement 
policies, and download behavior.  We included the following items: 
(a) Normative Response to Copyright Enforcement in Part 2.  Five statements 
and questions gauged the normative appraisal of online copyright infringements to 
detect potential anti-copyright norms:  (1) “These new developments are gradually 
making me realize that illegally downloading music is not ethical”; (2) “The 
policies of the music industry conflict with my sense of justice”; (3) “The policies 
of the music industry are an attack on my freedom to listen to music”; (4) “These 
developments are causing me to adjust my norms regarding the illegal exchanges of 
music”; and (5) “This is making me realize that legislators should step in and create 
more balanced rules in copyright law.” 
(b) Deterrent Effect of Copyright Enforcement in Part 2.  Four questions 
assessed participants’ evaluation of the effectiveness and likelihood of enforcement 
 
 117. See Nate Anderson, Major ISPs Agree to “Six Strikes” Copyright Enforcement Plan, 
ARSTECHNICA (July 7, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/07/major-isps-agree-to-six-
strikes-copyright-enforcement-plan/ [http://perma.cc/JA4G-A4VJ]. 
 118. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 
(2012); Luke S. Curran, Copyright Trolls, Defining the Line Between Legal Ransom Letters and 
Defending Digital Rights: Turning Piracy into a Business Model or Protecting Creative from Internet 
Lawlessness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 170, 189–90 (2013). 
 119. David Kravets, Biggest BitTorrent Downloading Case in U.S. History Targets 23,000 
Defendants, WIRED (May 14, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/05/biggest-bittorrent-case/ [http://
perma.cc/PQ3S-BD9M]. 
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with regard to their own and others’ potential copyright infringing behavior online:  
(1) “In your estimation, what are the chances of getting detected and prosecuted for 
file-sharing?”; and (2) “In your estimation, what percentage of the students who 
violate copyright law by downloading music on file-sharing networks will 
eventually be caught?” 
(c) Future Copyright Infringements in Part 2.  One item measured respondents’ 
current and future online consumption of copyrighted content:  (1) “In [the coming 
two years],120 how likely is it that you will download music from file-sharing 
platforms or technologies (not including iTunes and other licensed download 
stores)?”; and (2) “Most people will continue to take the risks involved with file 
sharing.” 
Respondents provided their responses on the basis of a seven-point scale, 
assigning scores between two endpoints (an answer of “1” indicated that the 
student strongly disagreed with the statement; “9” indicated that the student 
strongly agreed).121 
3.  Third Part 
The final part of our study presented respondents with a so-called immunity 
condition.  We informed respondents that a new technology is now capable of fully 
shielding them from all enforcement.  The scenario described how “a number of 
young computer experts have developed a new file-sharing application that cannot 
be traced.”  With this technology individual IP numbers are “scrambled as a result 
of which it will be as good as impossible for the music industry to detect and 
identify individuals who share music.”  In the first months of introducing this 
technology, the likelihood of getting caught will be reduced to 0.00000001% (1 in 
100.000,000 or 1/100 million).  We ask respondents what they will do in this “new 
situation” where “the likelihood of getting caught is reduced to 0.00000001% and 
the current policy of pursuing file sharing continues.” 
We asked participants if, and to what extent, they will resume downloading in 
light of this immunity.  We included the following items: 
Behavioral Adjustment in Part 3:  (1) “Because of the enforcement policy of the 
music industry prior to the introduction of the new protective software influences 
(see newspaper clipping), I will download more”; (2) “The enforcement policy of 
the music industry prior to the introduction of the new protective software (see 
article) influences the amount of music I will resume downloading”; (3) “In [the 
coming years], how likely is it that you will download music from file-sharing 
platforms or technologies (not including iTunes and other licensed download 
stores)?”; (4) “Your favorite new artist is about to release his/her/their new album. 
You receive a text message from a friend that the new album is available on the 
file-sharing platform that you use. How likely is it that you will download the 
 
 120. The dates were 2011–2012 and 2014–2015, respectively for both studies. 
 121. Items 2, 3, and 4 were reverse coded and combined with item 1 to form one average anti-
copyright norm score. 
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album rather than wait and buy the album when it will be released?”; and (5) “A 
friend shows you a file-sharing site that has all the music albums that you ever 
wanted.  Everyone on the site seems to have the same music taste as you do.  How 
many songs will you download?” 
Finally, it should be noted that the scenario methodology, as employed in this 
study, has certain strengths and weaknesses.  Generally, scenario studies combine 
the benefits of laboratory research and correlation research.122  Our study design 
enabled us to analyze causality by manipulating the independent variables, while 
using realistic, everyday situations based on statutory rules and case law.123  As is 
the case with all laboratory experiments, a study of this nature is susceptible to the 
criticism that the results cannot be generalized to the public at large.  For the 
present purpose, however, this criticism is less damaging.  By exclusively enlisting 
college students, our design measures the reactions of the specific group targeted in 
the litigation campaign by the entertainment industry.  A general limitation of any 
scenario study is of course that it does not measure actual behavior in the real 
world.  In this context, however, a laboratory experiment involving actual 
downloading by respondents is not feasible due to the copyright infringing nature 
of the activities involved.124 
IV.  RESULTS 
Part IV presents the main findings of our empirical study.  First, we describe the 
background of survey participants as it relates to their access to copyrighted 
content, past infringing behavior, subscription to legal content, future plans, 
perceived deterrence, and their judgment about the (im)morality of copyright 
infringements.  Next we present the results from the comparison of various 
enforcement systems.  Finally, we review the main findings when new technologies 
prevent enforcement. 
A.  PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS: THE COPYRIGHT LANDSCAPE 
The first part of our study surveyed how young individuals obtain copyrighted 
content, how they feel about copyright infringement, and what their expectations 
are about copyright enforcement. 
 
 122. See David De Cremer & Daan Van Knippenberg, How Do Leaders Promote Cooperation? 
The Effects Of Charisma And Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 858, 860 (2002). 
 123. See, e.g., Robert L. Dipboye, Laboratory vs. Field Research in Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology, 5 INT’L REV. INDUS. & ORG’L PSYCHOL. 1, 25 (1990) (addressing the legitimacy of 
laboratory research studies). 
 124. Studies that measure the effect of real-world file sharing on music industry sales have yielded 
varying findings and outcomes.  Compare Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File 
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 3 (2007) (minimizing the 
negative impact of file sharing on CD sales) with Stan Liebowitz, File-Sharing: Creative Destruction or 
just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14–17 (2006) (presenting evidence that file-sharing 
diminishes recording industry revenues).  For an overview of the empirical work in this area, see Stan 
Liebowitz, Economists Examine File-Sharing and Music Sales, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND THE 
DIGITAL ECONOMY 145 (Gerhard Illing & Martin Peitz eds., 2006). 
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1.  Copyright Infringements 
Most respondents admit having engaged in copyright infringing behavior at 
some point in the past.  As Table 1 below illustrates, over half of respondents report 
having downloaded more than 100 music files on peer-to-peer file sharing 
platforms (193 out of 349) and/or having exchanged other music from iPods and 
similar music storage devices (149 out of 349).125  Barely 11% of respondents (41 
out of 349) indicate that they never have downloaded unlicensed copies of music or 
movies from file sharing technologies. 
Music files are obtained in much larger numbers than movies:  70% of 
respondents report having downloaded more than 51 songs, compared to 12% who 
report having downloaded a comparable number movies.  Although movie files 
take more time to download than music due to their comparatively larger size, 
movies are regularly obtained by way of file-sharing platforms, as well as by direct 
transfers across devices. 
 
	 P2P           Swapping 
	 Music Movies Music Movies 
None 41 66 
Less than 10 16 92 16 99 
Between 10-50 48 61 51 54 
Between 51-100 51 19 65 15 
More than 100 193 25 149 10 
 
Table 1.  Access to Unlicensed Materials 
2.  Legal Consumption 
Over the past ten years, content industries have developed a wide range of 
online services through which one can obtain licensed music and movies (Spotify, 
Netflix, Amazon Prime, etc.).  To measure the impact of these legal alternatives on 
file-sharing and online copyright infringements, our 2014 and 2015 studies also 
surveyed respondents’ consumption patterns. 
Although obtaining music through authorized, online channels is commonplace, 
 
 125. Individuals can transfer their music and movie libraries readily across USB hard drives, 
memory sticks, iPod players, etc.  Like audiotape recordings of long-play records before it, such 
infringing copying is intractable to copyright holders.  Media reports suggest that young individuals 
have massive amounts of unauthorized music and movie content on their iPods and personal computers.  
See Depoorter et. al,  supra note 3, at 1254.  Our data confirms this trend.  As we discuss below, the 
distinction between users of peer-to-peer technologies on the one hand and users of direct swapping on 
the other hand can be useful in distinguishing between respondents with different levels of technological 
expertise. 
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illegal downloading is a complement to legal consumption for the vast majority of 
respondents.  In the 2014 group, 92.60% (88 out of 95) of respondents obtain music 
or movies from legal as well as unauthorized platforms. Only 7.4% of illegal 
downloaders obtain music exclusively through illegal means. 
 A similar pattern obtains for illegal and illegal streaming.  In the 2015 survey, 
98.3% of respondents indicate that they access licensed content from online 
streaming channels, while 42% of these respondents also report obtaining access by 
way of unlicensed streaming sites. 
3.  Prospective Copyright Infringements 
With regards to a declared intention to infringe copyright in the future, the data 
reveals a bifurcated landscape.  Both sides of the extreme are well-represented, 
with a large group of frequent downloaders (76/343 or 22%) and a large group of 
individuals not downloading at all (112/343 or 32%).  Download intensity was 
distributed fairly evenly between 2-8 over a 9 point scale, where 9 indicated “very 
likely.”  Download intentions have not reduced significantly over the past four 
years (4.34 in 2011 compared to 4.27 in 2014).  The data from 2014 provides some 
evidence of the potential impact of legal alternatives and copyright enforcement to 
date:  a subset of respondents indicates that it is very unlikely that they will engage 
in illegal downloading (31/103), while another group indicates that is very likely 
that they will engage in illegal downloading (21/103). 
Overall it appears that past infringing behavior is a relatively good predictor of 
future behavior.  Analysis of variance of future infringement behavior reveals a 
significant effect of past infringement behavior, F(1,338) = 20.78, p < .001.  
Respondents who have not engaged in copyright infringing behavior in the past do 
not reveal any intention to do so in the future.126  Conversely, frequent downloaders 
indicate that it is very likely they will continue to download in the future.127 
4.  Moral Perceptions of Copyright Infringements 
Respondents express ambivalence regarding the morality of online copyright 
infringements and illegal downloading.  When asked whether they feel that it is 
morally wrong to download music on peer-to-peer platforms, the median response 
(4.29) is near the midway point on a scale of 1 (“not at all” immoral) to 9 (“very” 
immoral).  Downloading movies is considered to be only slightly more immoral 
than music (4.59). 
Respondents also believe that the public is not very opposed to downloading 
music from peer-to-peer platforms (3.59).  Respondents do not anticipate 
disapproval of copyright infringing behavior from peers and friends (2.01). 
As illustrated by Figure 1 below, the moral perception of copyright infringing 
 
 126. On average, non-downloaders score 1.7 on a 9 point scale—with 9 being very likely—that 
they will begin downloading unlicensed content in the future. 
 127. On average, heavy downloaders score 5.54 on a 9 point scale—with 9 being very likely—that 
they will begin downloading unlicensed content in the future. 
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behavior has not changed much over the past decade.  Despite the content 
industry’s effort to align social norms with existing copyright laws, the normative 
evaluation of illegal downloading has remained relatively stable over the period 
from 2003 to 2014.  If anything, the perceived immorality of copyright 
infringements has reduced over time (from 4.86 in 2003 to 4.08 in 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Perceived Immorality of Illegal Downloading  (9 = very immoral) 
 
Next,  we examined the relationship between illegal downloading and the normative 
evaluation of copyright infringements.  As expected, moral evaluations and 
behavior are aligned:  frequent downloaders of infringing materials do not believe 
that file-sharing is very immoral.  Conversely, individuals who have never 
downloaded music or movies from peer-to-peer platforms are more likely to find 
such behavioral immoral.  Table 2 below illustrates this pattern.128 
 
Past Download 
History 
Perceived 
Immorality 
None 1.70 
Less than 10 2.94 
Between 10 - 50 3.26 
Between 50 - 100 3.16 
More than 100 5.54 
 
Table 2. Download History & Perceived Immorality (1 = Very Immoral) 
 
 128. Past download behavior significantly affected the moral perceptions of infringement behavior.  
We obtained a significant effect of past behavior, F(1,340) = 7.11, p < .001, on the item, “I feel that it is 
morally wrong to use file-sharing technology to download music without paying.”  A similar effect was 
obtained, F(1,338) = 6.18, p < .001, for the item, “The use of file-sharing technology to download 
movies without paying is morally condemnable.” 
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5.  Deterrence 
Respondents perceive the risks involved with illegal downloading to be quite 
modest.  When asked about the chances of getting caught for illegal downloading, 
34% of respondents estimate that the probability is less than one in a million.  
About 43% of respondents put the chance at less than 1/10,000.  When asked how 
many illegal downloaders will “face repercussions,” over 64% of respondents 
believe that “very few” will face any repercussions (1 out of 9 on a 9-point scale 
where 9 indicates very many and 1 very few).  The perceived chance of getting 
caught remained relatively stable between 2011 and 2014. 
Risk-estimations are very similar among non-downloaders and downloaders 
alike.  Both groups of respondents perceive the risk to be very modest (3.05 and 
3.18 on a 9 point scale where 1 indicates that “very few downloaders will face 
repercussions”).129  Moreover, as Table 3 below illustrates, when presenting 
different probabilities of getting caught, non-downloaders and downloaders are 
evenly distributed across risk estimations.130 
 
Perception of Risk Non-Downloader 
(in %) 
Downloader 
(in %) 
< 1/million 30.00 32.57 
< 1/10000 30.00 41.69 
< 1/1000 30.00 17.92 
< 1/100 7.50 4.23 
< 1/10 0.00 0.98 
< ½ 0.00 0.98 
Zero 2.50 1.62 
 
Table 3. Perceived Risk and Infringement Profile 
 
Just 7 out of 107 respondents in the 2014 survey received CAS notifications 
from their Internet service provider.  Although this number is too low to provide 
reliable information, respondents who previously received a CAS notification 
estimate the chances of enforcement to be much higher compared to respondents 
who have not received any CAS notification (for instance, 42% of CAS recipients 
estimate the chances of getting caught at 1/100, compared to 8% of non-CAS 
recipients). 
 
 129. The difference between the group of non-downloaders and the group of downloaders was 
non-significant, F(1,345) = .13, p < .75. 
 130. No significant differences between the group of non-downloaders and downloaders occurred, 
χ2 (df=6) = 5.70, p < .50. 
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B. EFFECT OF VARIOUS ENFORCEMENT APPROACHES: SCENARIOS 
In Part 2 we presented students with various current (and past) enforcement 
approaches.  By priming respondents with these enforcement systems, we 
examined the reactions of respondents to the various copyright enforcement 
approaches that have been deployed in the past decade.  We obtained the following 
results. 
1.  Effect on Public Attitudes 
Respondents reacted most negatively to the award of statutory damages for 
music-file sharing and to copyright enforcement as a law firm business strategy. 
On a 9 point scale, where 1 indicated maximum agreement with the statement 
that “music industry is conducting an unjust, disproportionate policy,” the news 
clipping of the statutory damage award in the Jammie Thomas-Rasset case received 
an average response of 4.09 (n=55), while the private troll model scored 4.60 
(n=50).  The other scenarios yielded higher scores on this item.131  The RIAA’s 
settlement letter campaign for instance was considered more acceptable (5.47, 
n=68).  Remarkably, however, respondents that read the description of the CAS 
(n=51) provided an evaluation that is only slightly more favorable than respondents 
in the group that read a description of the RIAA settlement campaign (5.74 versus 
5.47). 
Similarly, respondents agree most strongly with the statement that private troll 
enforcement and statutory damage awards “conflict with their sense of justice” 
(5.10 and 4,89, respectively, on an inverse 9 point scale, compared to an average of 
5.65 across all enforcement systems).132  Remarkably, respondents did respond 
more favorably to the CAS system (6.04) than to the RIAA settlement campaign 
(6.53).133  Although respondents do not agree very much (6.63 where 9 indicates 
disagreement) with the statement that the policies of the music industry are “an 
attack of the freedom to listen to music,” respondents again did not react more 
favorably to the CAS (6.47) than the RIAA settlement campaign (6.79).134 
When asked whether “legislators should step in to create more balanced rules in 
copyright law,”135 respondents voiced stronger agreement when confronted with the 
private troll description (3.64 where 1 indicates maximum agreement and 9 greatest 
disagreement) than when assigned the statutory award newspaper clipping 
(4.07).136  Here as well, responses to the CAS (4.61) are more negative than to the 
 
 131. The differences among scenarios on this item were significant, F(6,297) = 2.74, p = .013. 
 132. The full question reads, “I am of the opinion that the music industry is conducting an unjust, 
disproportionate policy.  The score of 1 indicates maximum agreement and 9 represent maximum 
disagreement.”  Table A.1 (see Appendix) presents the results for the various scenarios and variations.  
The effect of scenario on this item was significant, F(6,297) = 21.42, p = .027. 
 133. Although the response to the CAS was more negative than to the RIAA campaign, no 
significant difference was observed across both these enforcement scenarios. 
 134. Scenario type did not affect the scores on this item, F(6,297) = 1.54, p = .16. 
 135. The differences among scenarios were significant, F(6,295) = 3.82, p < .001). 
 136. Respondents in the group that received the newspaper clipping that described the decision of 
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RIAA settlement campaign (5.47).137 Downloaders (4.63) and non-downloaders 
(4.4) alike seem to share this sentiment.138 
None of the enforcement regimes seem likely to alter pre-existing attitudes 
about copyright infringement.139  When asked whether they agree that the 
developments in enforcement make them “realize that illegal downloading is 
unethical,” all enforcement systems fare rather poorly (5.58 on average, where 1 
indicates maximum agreement and 9 maximum disagreement). 
2.  Deterrent Effects 
When asked what the chances are of getting caught eventually for downloading 
music on file-sharing networks, 28% to 48% of respondents believe that the 
probability is less than one in a million.  Seventy to 80% of respondents estimate 
that the likelihood is between 1/1,000,000 and 1/10,000.  Although the difference is 
non-significant, respondents estimate that the chances of getting caught under the 
CAS are somewhat higher than with the RIAA settlement letter campaign (49% 
versus 35% at 1/10,000; 9.80% versus 2.94% at 1/100).  While 44.12% of 
respondents in the RIAA group put the chances at less than one in one million, only 
29.41% of respondents in the CAS group estimate the chances that low.140 
Overall, respondents do not anticipate that any of the presented enforcement 
models are likely to deter online piracy.  Across all enforcement scenarios, 
respondents believe that “most people will continue to take the risks involved with 
file-sharing” (2.78 on a 9 point scale where 1 indicates maximum agreement).  The 
private troll model and the CAS are the only two enforcement scenarios that obtain 
a statistically significantly higher score than the other scenarios (3.58 and 3.61, 
respectively).141 
 
C.  EFFECT OF PERFECT ANONYMITY 
Prior research suggests that punitive approaches to copyright enforcement 
regimes can have a backlash effect.  A prior research study that we conducted with 
360 undergraduates demonstrated that stringent enforcement regimes might induce 
higher overall downloading when new technologies reduce the risk of 
apprehension.142  The present study extends this research by exploring the effect of 
 
the judge to lower the jury award felt even more strongly (3.68) that reform is needed. 
 137. The mean scores are 5.26 for non-downloaders and 4.32 for downloaders.  
 138. Differences do appear, however, with regard to the reactions to the RIAA settlement 
campaign.  Downloaders reacted much more adversely to downloading than non-downloaders.  This 
observation is in line with prior research that showed that public reaction to file sharing depends on prior 
usage of file sharing technology.  
 139. Non-significant:  F(6,297) = 1.94, p = .075.   
 140. Non-significant: χ2 (df = 36) = 40.44, p = .28.),.  
 141. Scenario type yielded a significant effect on this item, F(6,297) = 5.47, p < .001. 
 142. See Ben Depoorter, et. al, supra note 3, at 1252 (observing download backlash effect when 
manipulating the severity of punishment in enforcement scenarios). 
DEPOORTER & VAN HIEL, COPYRIGHT ALERT ENFORCEMENT, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2015)  
266 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:2 
variations in the severity of enforcement within existing copyright enforcement 
approaches.  The final part of our study informed participants of a new technology 
capable of creating perfect anonymity, thereby fully shielding them from copyright 
enforcement.143  We examined the effect of the various enforcement regimes on the 
prospective download behavior of respondents in this subsequent, hypothetical 
state of immunity. 
Participants who previously faced the scenario of severe sanctions indicate that 
they plan to engage in more downloading relative to participants faced with more 
moderate enforcement scenarios.  When asked whether the enforcement policy 
prior to the introduction of the new protective software would make them 
download more, private trolls and statutory awards scored the highest (4.54 and 
4.45, respectively on a scale where 1 = not at all and 9 = very much so).  Again, the 
results for the RIAA settlement campaign and the CAS are closely matched (3.88 
and 3.84, respectively). 
When respondents were asked about the likelihood that they will download 
music from file-sharing platforms or with unlicensed technologies in the coming 
years, the overall number is 4.46 (9 being likely).  The most punitive enforcement 
conditions (trolls and statutory awards) and the settlement campaign generate 
higher numbers (4.77, 4.94, and 4.91, respectively) than the CAS (4.39). 
When presented with the opportunity to download all possible music albums on 
a new file-sharing website, participants in the statutory award and the RIAA groups 
indicate the most strongly that they will be inclined to do so (5.45 and 5.18, 
respectively; about 25% of respondents in those groups indicate the maximum 
score of 9 where 1 indicates “unlikely” and 9 indicates “likely”). 
Finally, our analysis reveals that the differentiated backlash effect triggered by 
the various enforcement scenarios applies to illegal downloaders and non-
downloaders alike.  Although non-downloaders of course report a lower intention 
overall of downloading in the future (1.7) than prior downloaders (4.7), the CAS 
and the RIAA campaign equally increase the likelihood to download once shielded 
from enforcement. 
V.  DISCUSSION 
A.  THE STATE OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENTS TODAY 
In the late 1990s, online music copyright infringements were widespread among 
the younger generation.  What has changed in the intervening fifteen years between 
Napster and today?  Many commentators attribute the massive scale of music 
copyright infringement in the 1990s to the lack of legal online alternatives to 
compete with popular file-sharing services such as Napster.144  Perhaps, then, 
 
 143. To some degree, virtual private networks can provide some of the anonymity that shields 
against most online enforcement.  See Ernesto Van der Sar, Which VPN Service Takes Your Privacy 
Seriously?, TORRENTFREAK (Dec. 12, 2014), http://torrentfreak.com/which-vpn-services-take-your-
anonymity-seriously-2014-edition-140315/ [http://perma.cc/B9Q5-698Y].  
 144. For an overview of these developments, see Raymond Ku, Creative Destruction, 69 U. CHI. 
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fifteen years later, licensed Internet music stores and subscription services have 
diminished the appeal of illegal file-sharing and unlicensed streaming platforms.145 
Although our data does not measure actual downloading, Part 1 of our study 
provides a window into infringement and consumption patterns among the young 
adults that were on college campuses during the peak of the peer-to-peer file-
sharing era in the late ‘90s. 
The results from our study suggest that most young adults have indeed embraced 
digital markets to obtain licensed music and movies.  Ninety-three percent of 
respondents report buying music at online stores or subscribing to licensed content 
providers (e.g. Netflix and Spotify).  At the same time, however, our results 
indicate that individuals have not sworn off illegal downloading.  Most respondents 
who are currently subscribed to streaming music services or who purchase music 
online also engage in illegal downloading.  What’s more, they report an intention to 
continue doing so. 
It appears that illegal access to copyrighted materials remains an important part 
of the lives of many young individuals.  For many, illegal-streaming sites serve a 
supplementary role, perhaps providing content that is not currently available from 
licensed subscription services or that is missing from the services they have 
subscribed to.146  For others, illegal downloading might be a means to obtain 
additional music and movies on a maxed out budget.  Additionally, some 
individuals may be using online platforms to obtain access to copyrighted materials 
that they would not purchase anyway.  In this manner, illegal downloading may 
serve to satisfy a curiosity about copyrighted content in a way that does not 
displace sales that would have occurred but for piracy.  Here, the best-case scenario 
for artists is that the resulting, additional exposure may generate some additional 
income by way of additional tickets sale for live performances, sales of derivate 
works, etc.147 
B.  STABLE COPY-NORMS 
In the period between 1999 and 2004, young individuals were relatively anti-
 
L. REV. 263 (2002) (describing peer-to-peer file sharing as a disruptive technology that challenges the 
outdated music business model).  
 145. The development of relatively inexpensive subscription models, such as Spotify, that mimic 
the all you can eat buffet style of peer-to-peer venues, holds the promise of substituting for less 
convenient and riskier, illegal content. 
 146. HBO, for instance, is not included in most mainstream subscription services (Netflix).  
HBO’s Game of Thrones has been the most illegally downloaded show for three years straight in this 
country.  See Erik Hayden, ‘Game of Thrones’ Tops List of 2014’s Most Pirated TV Shows, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Dec. 27, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/game-thrones-tops-
list-2014s-760409 [http://perma.cc/5ZEU-J6JG].  
 147. Raymond Ku, Creative Destruction, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (describing the effect of 
file-sharing technology as disrupting old business models).  New business models are needed to generate 
income if sampling or exposure decreases subsequent sales of albums.  See Stan J. Liebowitz, Testing 
File-Sharing’s Impact by Examining Record Sales in Cities, 54(4) MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 852, 852–59 
(2008) (arguing that sampling and exposure effects reduce music album sales).  
DEPOORTER & VAN HIEL, COPYRIGHT ALERT ENFORCEMENT, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2015)  
268 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:2 
copyright.148  By imposing indirect copyright liability on file-sharing software 
developers and host sites, the music industry’s legal campaign effectively shut 
down new technologies that had become an integral part of the daily lives of young 
individuals.  Because the RIAA’s aggressive campaign turned college campuses 
into major targets for enforcement, college students (many of whom were already 
confronting large amounts of debt and soaring tuition fees) perceived the 
organization’s settlements letters as excessive and punitive in nature. 
Despite extensive efforts to improve public relations, including the development 
of the CAS, little seems to have changed.  Our data demonstrates that prevailing 
copy-norms have remained relatively robust over time.  If anything, there has been 
a slight regression.  A vast majority of students do not perceive downloading as 
immoral, a view held by even more students today than just three years ago.  Social 
science research confirms that once internalized, normative priorities do indeed 
become robust or “sticky,” presenting a more pervasive challenge to law 
enforcement.149 
Not surprisingly, our data confirms that frequent downloaders tend to find 
copyright infringing behavior less immoral than do individuals who have never 
downloaded music or movies from peer-to-peer platforms.  This moral belief 
among file sharers appears to be self-serving.  Prior research on the bi-directional 
causality observed between self-interest and normative evaluations suggests that 
individuals tend to “adjust their own beliefs so as to justify their behavior as right 
and ethical.”150  In the context at hand, frequent infringers simply have more to lose 
from stringent enforcement.  This, in turn, may induce a normative belief that file 
sharing should be legal.151  This finding is in line with research on cognitive 
dissonance152 that suggests individuals tend to adjust their attitudes and beliefs 
whenever they experience a conflict with their perceptions of reality.153  
 
 148. Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright 
Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1141 (2005).  
 149. On the process of social norm internalization and the relation to law, see Robert Cooter, Do 
Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 
(2000); Robert Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and 
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 150. Michael Wenzel, Motivation or Rationalization? Causal Relations Between Ethics, Norms 
and Tax Compliance, 26 J. OF ECON. PSYCHOL. 491, 505 (2005). 
 151. Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Porgarsky, An Experimental Investigation of Deterrence: Cheating, 
Self-serving Bias, and Impulsivity, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 167 (2003) (presenting new experimental 
evidence). 
 152. For a description of how individuals reconcile the conflict between normative priors and legal 
regulation, see Joshua Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive us Crazy, and How We 
Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA TAX L. REV. 155, 200 (1996) (explaining that according to the theory of 
cognitive dissonance, “[w]hen we sense something in the world that is inconsistent with the cognitive 
frame through which we see the world, we initially (unconsciously) ignore or distort our perception. If 
that becomes impossible, we eventually amend our cognitive frame (i.e., the way we see and understand 
the world) to incorporate our new perception.”). 
 153. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1983); 
LEO FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).  The classic example of this is 
expressed in the fable where a fox sees some high-hanging grapes and wishes to eat them.  When the fox 
is unable to reach the grapes, he surmises that the grapes are probably not worth eating, as they must not 
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Accordingly, file-sharers might adjust their beliefs about copyright infringement as 
a means of coping with the uncomfortable feeling of engaging in immoral conduct. 
Research in cognitive psychology suggests that individuals come to disregard the 
obviously self-interested origin of such normative adjustments.154  Following this 
self-adjustment in belief, the next step is to “generalize these views to others, 
presumably to gain further social support.”155  Predictions about others’ beliefs or 
behaviors, based on casual observation, are very likely to err in the direction of 
one’s own personal beliefs or behavior.156 
Indeed, the findings from our study indicate that students (a) don’t believe that 
non-commercial, copyright infringing behavior online is particularly immoral, (b) 
think that the rest of the world deems it even less immoral, and (c) believe that their 
peers don’t think it is immoral at all. 
C.  IN PURSUIT OF DETERRENCE WITHOUT BACKLASH 
Students perceive the risks involved with illegal downloading to be very modest.  
In the minds of students, copyright enforcement is an issue faced only by the 
unlucky few. 
Interestingly, downloaders and non-downloaders share similar perceptions of the 
risks involved with downloading.  This suggests that when individuals refrain from 
downloading, it is not because they consider the risk to be higher than downloaders 
do.  Other variables, such as greater risk aversion, lower technical proficiency, or a 
lesser desire to obtain content, must be influencing the decision not to download. 
Although we did not obtain sufficient data points to confirm this finding with 
confidence, our preliminary findings suggest that CAS notification letters 
considerably increase expectations of enforcement.  Indeed, the small sample bias 
effect among recipients is a key to the potential efficacy of the CAS as an 
enforcement strategy.  A CAS letter received by just one individual in a small 
group of peers might induce within the group a risk estimation that far exceeds the 
actual statistical probability of receiving a CAS letter on average.157  To further this 
purpose it is of course paramount that sufficient CAS letters are issued.158  It should 
also be noted that even when an individual regards the chances of CAS detection as 
 
be ripe or that they are probably sour.  AESOP, THE FOX AND THE GRAPES (ca. 620–564 BCE). 
 154. Wenzel, supra note 150 (describing two-way causality between self-interest and normative 
beliefs). 
 155. Wenzel, supra note 150.  
 156. For a description of the false consensus effect, see, e.g., Brian Mullen, Jennifer Atkins, 
Debbie Champion, Cecelia Edwards, Dana Hardy, John Story & Mary Vanderklok, The False 
Consensus Effect: A Meta-Analysis Of 115 Hypothesis Tests, 21 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
262 (1985); Lee Ross, David Greene & Pamela House, The False Consensus Phenomenon: An 
Attributional Bias In Self-Perception And Social Perception Processes, 13 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 279 (1977). 
 157. Economists refer to small-sample bias where a set of observations is too small to obtain an 
accurate average measure from the sample. 
 158. In its first annual report, the nonprofit Center for Copyright Information (CCI) reported that 
CAS sent more than 1.3 million Copyright Alerts to account holders in the first ten months of operation.  
Supra note 76. 
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extremely high, due to a prior CAS notification, this does not necessary deter future 
infringements.  Since the mitigation measures are postponed to stages 5 and 6, the 
first four CAS notifications merely intend to inform subscribers that their download 
behavior has not gone unnoticed.  To technologically proficient subscribers, CAS 
simply provides a timeline to invest in their own mitigation measures to prevent 
future detection, measures that most often involve hiding one’s IP address (usually 
by installing a Virtual Private Network (VPN), or by subscribing to a TOR service).  
The private costs imposed by a CAS notification to a recipient consist of (a) the 
feeling of being watched and (b) having to take additional measures to avoid the 
inconvenience of potential mitigation measures in stages 5 and 6.  Metaphorically, 
if a RIAA settlement letter is akin to being struck by lightning, a CAS notification 
resembles a weather report warning one to avoid open areas.  To ramp up 
deterrence another notch, content holders could create credible fear among 
subscribers that they might initiate legal action against some CAS recipients.  This 
option would clash with the goal of CAS as a non-aggressive enforcement 
approach and also undermine the mutual understanding with ISPs, however. 
D.  NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 
While Part 1 of our study observed the beliefs, behavior, and expectations of 
students with respect to their experience of the past decade of digital copyright 
enforcement, in Part 2 we examined student reactions to specific enforcement 
approaches. 
The negative reaction to copyright trolls and statutory awards seem to suggest 
that students most strongly disapprove of enforcement approaches to copyright law 
that (a) are linked to for-profit incentives and (b) involve rewards in excess of 
actual damages.  Interestingly, the CAS is consistently met with as much 
disapproval as the RIAA settlement campaign.  While the stated goal of the CAS is 
to “enhance the consumer experience in the digital world”159 and “to reach 
consumers, provide them with useful information”,160 our findings indicate that 
college students perceive the system very differently.  The CAS, like the RIAA 
before it, is not perceived as an ideal compromise between various stakeholders, 
but rather as another indication of the need for more balanced copyright law.  In 
fact, when students were asked whether they feel that the “music industry is 
conducting an unjust, disproportionate policy,” a description of the CAS prompted 
more negative reactions than the RIAA settlement campaign.  Finally, we find no 
compelling evidence that the CAS brings about any more positive reactions that 
might help realign personal beliefs about online behavior with existing copyright 
laws than any other system. 
These findings beg the question of why the moderate approach of the CAS has 
not generated more positive reactions.  Several observations from social science 
scholarship are informative.  First, the optimism about the CAS’s potential for 
 
 159. Statement by CCI Executive Director Jill Lesser, after the first year of CAS, supra note 76. 
 160. Statement by CCI Board co-chair Tom Dailey of Verizon, supra note 76. 
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norm reversal ignores the path dependence in the evolution of norms.  Because 
copy-norms have been internalized and subsequently bolstered by harsh 
enforcement strategies, it is unrealistic to expect that a more moderate enforcement 
approach alone can reverse the prevailing social norms around copyright.  Second, 
the architects of the CAS may seem to have underestimated the privacy sensitivity 
of young individuals.161  Although this generation voluntarily turns over volumes of 
personal information on social network sites, survey reports show that today’s 
Internet users are very concerned about the illicit use of their personal 
information.162  The CAS partners are quick to point out that the system respects 
consumer privacy.  Copyright holders generate their notices of alleged copyright 
infringement through the use of publicly available IP address data, and ISPs deliver 
their alerts to account holders without sharing their personally identifiable 
information with content owners.163 
Yet many subscribers are not so easily reassured.  Setting aside the differences 
in final outcome, the CAS shares some important attributes with the RIAA 
campaign.  Under both systems, subscribers are informed that their online behavior 
is not under the radar.  Although the architects of the CAS emphasize that ISPs 
shield the identity of infringing subscribers from content holders, the fact remains 
that making the ISP the messenger might counteract the system’s conciliatory 
goals.  From a privacy perspective, an ISP hits close to home since it provides the 
gateway to a person’s online activities.  Even the noblest, moderate intentions of 
the CAS might not be able to undo the suspicions and subjective privacy harms 
brought about in the process. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In an effort to halt online piracy, copyright holders have experimented with a 
wide variety of enforcement approaches this past decade.  Along the way, copyright 
law’s approval ratings plummeted.164  Despite its soft stance and lack of punitive 
intentions, the latest iteration of copyright enforcement is unlikely to reverse liberal 
copy-norms and halt copyright infringing behavior online. 
Based on social science research and our empirical findings, this Article 
suggests that architects of the Copyright Alert System may have underestimated the 
 
     161.    Although the CAS was not designed primarily to address the behavior of the most fervent 
online infringers (perhaps the majority of which are young individuals), the reactions of this generation 
to the CAS nevertheless is highly relevant since young individuals are major consumers of entertainment 
products and because they are of course the adults (voters, policy-makers, etc.) of tomorrow. 
     162.   For an overview of results of privacy surveys, see Public Opinion on Privacy, ELECTRONIC 
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, https://epic.org/privacy/survey/. 
 163. CCI Provides First Copyright Alert System Progress Report Highlighting Initial 
Accomplishments, CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMATION (May 28, 2014), http://
www.copyrightinformation.org/press-release/cci-provides-first-copyright-alert-system-progress-report-
highlighting-initial-accomplishments/ [http://perma.cc/7LXH-6ZEJ]. 
 164. Peter Menell, This American Copyright Life: Reflections on Re-Equilibrating Copyright in the 
Internet Age, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 235, 241–69 (2014) (noting that it is essential to restore 
public support for copyright law’s purposes and rules).  
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robustness of social norms and have failed to anticipate the negative reactions to a 
copyright information system, in particular as it relates to perceived privacy harms. 
Like other copyright enforcement approaches before it, the Copyright Alert 
System makes no advances in distinguishing between harmful infringing behavior 
and non-harmful yet infringing behavior, a failure that likely will continue to 
plague the normative acceptance of copyright law in the Internet age. 
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APPENDIX 
SURVEY FORM 
 
1. INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
1. Please answer the question below. All responses will remain strictly anonymous. 
2. Please answer all questions chronologically. Do not switch between pages or leave 
open questions or return to previous questions at any point. 
 
 
A. Have you ever downloaded music or movies from the Internet using file-sharing 
technology?  
 
Note: this could include you use of Napster, Grokster, Kazaa, Vuze, Pirate Bay, Rapidshare, 
all existing Bittorent platforms, or any other on line technology that enables downloading 
music without paying for it. Please exclude from consideration Itunes store or other licensed 
downloading sites. 
 
       YES             NO              (please circle) 
 
 
       If so, how many songs have you downloaded with these technologies (estimate)? 
 
      0   /   less than 10  /   between 10-50  /   between 51-100   /   more than 100______ songs 
 
 
      If so, how movies have you downloaded with these technologies (estimate)? 
 
 
      0   /   less than 10  /   between 10-50  /   between 51-100   /   more than 100          movies                
 
 
 
B. Have you shared music or movies with your friends from each other’s archives on your 
PC/MAC/IPODS?  
 
       YES            NO              (please circle) 
 
 
       If so, how many songs have you shared (estimate)? 
 
       0   /   less than 10  /   between 10-50  /   between 51-100   /   more than 100       songs 
 
 
      If so, how many movies have you shared (estimate)? 
 
       0   /   less than 10  /   between 10-50  /   between 51-100   /   more than 100 movies 
        
 
 
DEPOORTER & VAN HIEL, COPYRIGHT ALERT ENFORCEMENT, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2015)  
274 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:2 
 
2. INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
Please answer the question below. All responses will remain strictly anonymous. 
 
 
I feel that it is morally wrong to use file-sharing technology to download music without 
paying. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Not at all       Very Much So 
 
The music industry has lobbied hard in Washington, DC to obtain favorable rules for the 
industry. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Agree       Disagree 
 
The use of file-sharing technology to download movies without paying is morally 
condemnable. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Not at all       Very Much So 
 
In 2011-2012, how likely is it that you will download music from file-sharing platforms or 
technologies (not including Itunes and other licensed download stores)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Unlikely = 1       Likely = 9 
 
Your favorite new artist is about to release his/her/their new album. You receive a text 
message from a friend that the new album is available on the file-sharing platform that you 
use. How likely is it that you will download the album rather than wait and buy the album 
when it will be released? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Unlikely = 1       Likely = 9 
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A friend shows you a file-sharing site that has all the music albums that you ever wanted. 
Everyone on the site seems to have the same music taste as you do. How many songs will 
you download? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
None = 1       All = 9 
 
Do people in general think that downloading music without paying for it is morally correct? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Not at all       Very Much So 
 
How likely is it that your friends and peers will disapprove when you tell them that you 
download music on file-sharing networks? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Not at all       Very Much So 
 
In your estimation, how many file-shares that continue to download on a daily basis will face 
repercussions? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Very few = 1       Very many = 9 
 
In your estimation, what are the chances of getting detected and prosecuted for file-sharing? 
 
Zero Less 
than 
1/million 
Less 
than 
1/10000 
About 
1/1000 
About 
1/100 
About  
1/10 
About  
1/2 
Almost 
certain 
 
In your estimation, what are the chances of getting detected and receiving a letter from your 
Internet service provider or the Recording Industry Association about your file-sharing? 
 
Zero Less 
than 
1/million 
Less 
than 
1/10000 
About 
1/1000 
About 
1/100 
About  
1/10 
About  
½ 
Almost 
certain 
 
 
In your estimation, what percentage of the students who violate copyright law by 
downloading music on file-sharing networks will eventually be caught? 
 
Zero Less 
than 
1/million 
Less 
than 
1/10000 
About 
1/1000 
About 
1/100 
About  
1/10 
About  
1/2 
Almost 
certain 
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3. INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
Please read carefully, the following newspaper clipping from a recent article in a major 
American newspaper. It describes the current approach to enforcing file-sharers. 
 
 
[vignette scenario, see Part III.B.2 above] 
 
 
 
 
 
4. INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
Please answer the question below. 
 
 
Most people will continue to take the risks involved with file sharing. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Agree = 1       Disagree = 9 
 
These new developments are gradually making me realize that illegally downloading music 
is not ethical. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Agree = 1       Disagree = 9 
 
  
I am of the opinion that the music industry is conducting an unjust, disproportionate policy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Agree = 1       Disagree = 9 
 
 
The policies of the music industry conflict with my sense of justice. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Agree = 1       Disagree = 9 
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In your estimation, what percentage of the students who violate copyright law by 
downloading music on file-sharing networks will eventually be caught? 
 
Zero Less 
than 
1/million 
Less 
than 
1/10000 
About 
1/1000 
About 
1/100 
About  
1/10 
About  
1/2 
Almost 
certain 
 
The policies of the music industry are an attack on my freedom to listen to music. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Agree = 1       Disagree = 9 
 
These developments are causing me to adjust my norms regarding the illegal exchanges of 
music. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Agree = 1       Disagree = 9 
 
This is making me realize that legislators should step in and create more balanced rules in 
copyright law. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Agree = 1       Disagree = 9 
 
In your estimation, what are the chances of getting detected and prosecuted for file-sharing? 
 
Zero Less 
than 
1/millio
n 
Less 
than 
1/10000 
About 
1/1000 
About 
1/100 
About  
1/10 
About  
1/2 
Almost 
certain 
 
In 2011-2012, how likely is it that you will download music from file-sharing platforms or 
technologies (not including Itunes and other licensed download stores)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Unlikely = 1       Likely = 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPOORTER & VAN HIEL, COPYRIGHT ALERT ENFORCEMENT, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2015)  
278 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [39:2 
5. INSTRUCTIONS: 
 
       A number of young computer experts have developed new file-sharing application that 
cannot be traced.  Due to this technology, the IP numbers will be scrambled as a result of 
which it will be as good as impossible for the music industry to detect and identify 
individuals who share music.  In the first months of introducing this technology, the 
likelihood of getting caught will be reduced to 0,00000001% (1 in 100.000,000 or 1/100 
million). This new program will be introduced at the start of 2012.  What will you do in this 
“new situation” when the likelihood of getting caught is reduced to 0,00000001% and the 
current policy of pursuing file sharing continues? 
 
Because of the enforcement policy of the music industry prior to the introduction of the new 
protective software influences (see news paper clipping), I will download more. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Not at all       Very much so 
 
      The enforcement policy of the music industry prior to the introduction of the new 
protective software (see article) influences the amount of music I will resume downloading. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Not at all       Very much so 
 
In 2011-2012, how likely is it that you will download music from file-sharing platforms or 
technologies (not including Itunes and other licensed download stores)? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Unlikely = 1       Likely = 9 
 
Your favorite new artist is about to release his/her/their new album. You receive a text 
message from a friend that the new album is available on the file-sharing platform that you 
use. How likely is it that you will download the album rather than wait and buy the album 
when it will be released? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
Unlikely = 1       Likely = 9 
 
A friend shows you a file-sharing site that has all the music albums that you ever wanted. 
Everyone on the site seems to have the same music taste as you do. How many songs will 
you download? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8      9 
None = 1       All = 9 
      Thank you for your cooperation! 
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TABLE A.1: SCENARIOS: MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR THE PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
 
 
Unjust Sense of 
justice 
Attack Balanced Downloading 
unethical 
RIAA regular 5.47b 6.53b 6,79 5.47b 6.74 
Rasset – Stat 
D 
4.09a 4.89a 5.96 4.07a 5.26 
Rasset – RED 5.28b 5.76ab 7.18 3.68a 5.04 
CAS 5.74b 6.04ab 6.47 4.61ab 5.51 
RIAA 
random 
5.55b 5.70ab 6.97 5.39b 6.03 
Trolls 4.60ab 5.10a 6.42 3.64a 5.27 
RIAA 
dropped 
5.46b 6.00ab 7.03 4.78ab 5.81 
Grand Mean 5.11 5.65 6.63 4.42 5.59 
F 2.74 2.42 1.54 3.82 1.94 
P < .02 < .03 < .17 < .001 < .08 
 
Note. Different superscripts refer to significant differences among figures written in the same 
column. Unjust refers to the item “I am of the opinion that the music industry is conducting 
an unjust, disproportionate policy”; Sense of justice refers to the item “The policies of the 
music industry conflict with my sense of justice”, Attack refers to the item “The policies of 
the music industry are an attack on my freedom to listen to music”; Balanced refers to the 
item “This is making me realize that legislators should step in and create more balanced 
rules in copyright law”, and Donwloading unethical refers to the item “These new 
developments are gradually making me realize that illegally downloading music is not 
ethical.” 
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TABLE A.2: SCENARIOS: MEAN DIFFERENCES FOR DETERRENCE 
 
 
Continue Likely download Songs new site 
RIAA regular 1.97a 4.91 5.18 
Rasset – Stat D 2.69a 4.94 5.45 
Rasset – RED 2.44a 3.71 4.95 
CAS 3.61b 4.39 4.59 
RIAA random 2.33a 3.70 4.70 
Trolls 3.58b 4.77 4.86 
RIAA dropped 2.22a 4.54 4.53 
Grand Mean 2.77 4.46 4.91 
F 5.47 1.15 .55 
P < .001 < .34 < .77 
 
Note. Different superscripts refer to significant differences among figures written in the same 
column. Continue refers to the item “Most people will continue to take the risks involved 
with file sharing”; Likely download refers to the item “In 2011-2012, how likely is it that 
you will download music from file-sharing platforms or technologies (not including Itunes 
and other licensed download stores)?” and Songs new site refers to the item “A friend shows 
you a file-sharing site that has all the music albums that you ever wanted. Everyone on the 
site seems to have the same music taste as you do. How many songs will you download?” 
 
 
